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Abstract 
In a highly distributed computing environment, people frequently move from one place to 
another where the new system has no previous knowledge of them at all. Traditional access 
control mechanisms such as access matrix and RBAC depend heavily on central management. 
However, the identities and privileges of the users are stored and administered in different 
locations in distributed systems. How to establish trust between these strange entities remains a 
challenge. Many efforts have been made to solve this problem. In the previous work, the 
decentralised administration of trust is achieved through delegation which is a very rigid 
mechanism. The limitation of delegation is that the identities of the de legators and delegatees must 
be known in advance and the privileges must be definite. In this thesis, we present a new model 
for decentralised administration of trust: trust empowerment. In trust empowerment, trust is 
defined as a set of properties. Properties can be owned and/or controlled. Owners of the properties 
can perform the privileges denoted by the properties. Controllers of the properties can grant the 
properties to other subjects but cannot gain the privileges of the properties. Each subject has its 
own policy to define trust empowerment. We design the Mojoy trust policy language that supports 
trust empowerment. We give the syntax, semantics and an XML implementation of the language. 
The Mojoy trust policy language is based on XACML, which is an OASIS standard. We develop a 
compliance checker for the language. The responsibility of the compliance checker is to examine 
the certificates and policy, and return a Boolean value to indicate whether the user's request is 
allowed. We apply our new model, the language and the compliance checker to a case study to 
show that they are capable of coping with the trust issues met in the distributed systems. 
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Chapter 1 Traditional Access Control 
1 Traditional Access Control 
The research of access control began from the early 1960s primarily centred in database 
management and operating systems. The objective was to protect system resources from 
unauthorised access. 
1.1 Authentication, authorisation and access control 
According to Apache definition [28], authentication is the procedure of verifying the users 
are who they claim they are. This is usually done by verifying the usemame/password, public 
key/private key, smart cards, or some other biological methods, such as voice recognition or 
fingerprints, to prove the identity. 
Authorisation is to inspect whether the identified user has the permission to perform the 
specific action to the resource. This is done by checking the user's roles, privileges or attributes. 
Authorisation is analogous to checking tickets at the entrance of the cinema. Authentication and 
authorisation are closely related and in most implementations inextricable. 
Access control is a much more general way of talking about controlling access to resources. 
Access decisions are made based on arbitrary conditions, such as network IP address, the time of 
day, the attributes of the user, or the version of the browser, etc. It is analogous to closing the door 
at a specific time or only letting people in by their ages. 
1.2 MAC and DAC 
The efforts of research and development on the part of the United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) over a period of twenty plus years formed a set of security criteria, criteria 
interpretations, and guidelines. It was the best known US computer security standard: the Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). It contains security features and assurances, 
exclusively derived, engineered and rationalized based on DoD security policy, created to meet 
one major security objective -preventing the unauthorised observation of classified information. 
The TCSEC has defmed two types of access control: Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
and Mandatory Access Control (MAC). 
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1.2.1 DAC 
As defined in the TCSEC and commonly implemented, DAC [ 45] is "A means of restricting 
access to objects based on the identity of subject and/or groups to which they belong. The controls 
are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access pem1ission is capable of passing 
that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject (unless restrained by mandatory access 
control)" [8]. Since its appearance in 1983, DAC have been perceived as being technically correct 
for both commercial and civilian government security needs. 
As the name implies, DAC permits the granting and revoking of access privileges to be left to 
the discretion of the individual users. A DAC mechanism allows users to grant or revoke access to 
any of the objects under their control without the intercession of the system administrator. 
To illustrate the model of DAC, we need to first clarify several basic concepts. A subject is a 
process/program in the system; it can create other subjects; it is launched by a user. A subject has 
only one user as its owner, but a user can have multiple subjects. The relations between subjects, 
objects and access rights can be represented by an access matrix [ 46]. Subjects are represented in 
rows and objects are represented in columns. The cells contain the access rights assigned to the 
subjects that can be perfonned on the corresponding objects. The access rights are defined as As.o• 
where s is the subject and o is the object. 
• If action E As,o. then s can perform action on o. 
• If the copy flag is set, i.e., *action E A5,0 , then s can add action to any cell in the column 
of o, i.e., assign access rights of o to any subject. 
• If owner E As,o. then s is the owner of o, s can assign access rights of o to any subject, i.e., 
add action to any cell in the column of o. 
• If ownerE A5,0 , then s can revoke any subject's access rights to o, i.e., remove any 
"unprotected" action in the cells of the column of o. 
For example, Table 1-1 embodies an access matrix for users and files (r stands for read, w for 
write, a for append, d for delete, o for owner, and e for execute). As we can see from the table, rE 
AAiice,Filei. then Alice can read File 1. o E AAiice,Filel, then Alice can modify the actions in the cells of 
the column File 1. 
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Table 1-1 access matrix 
File! File2 File3 File4 
Alice rwo rwd 
Bob r ro 
Clare reo 
Duncan rwad 
An access matrix is usually sparse and can be implemented in several ways: 
• Capabilities. A capability specifies what action a subject could perform on the designated 
object. 
• Profiles. A profile contains a list of objects associated with a subject. 
• Access Control List (ACL). ACL is the most desirable implementation of access matrix. 
An ACL contains a list of users/groups and their access rights to the designated objects. 
• Protection Bits. It is the protection mechanism adopted by UNIX file system [44]. The 
creator of the file is the owner. The owner set the protection bits to indicate whether the 
owner, the group, or everyone could have the specific access right of the file. 
• Passwords. The user gains a specific access right to the object by providing corresponding 
password. 
However, in many organizations, the end users do not "own" the information for which they 
are allowed to access. For these organizations, the corporation or agency is the actual "owner" of 
the system objects as well as the programs that process it. This brings in MAC. 
1.2.2 MAC 
Mandatory Access Control was defined in the TCSEC as "A means of restricting access to 
objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the 
objects and the formal authorization (i.e. clearance) of subjects to access information of such 
sensitivity" [8]. 
MAC applies where protection decisions must not be decided by the object owner and must 
be enforced by the system. It is aimed to solve the problems that were unable to be dealt with by 
DAC. 
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The concept of MAC was first fonnalized as the Bell-LaPadula model by Bell and LaPadula 
[47]. Sandhu chose the essential assets from it and drew a minimal model, which was called BLP 
[49]. In BLP, MAC policies are expressed through the security labels attached to subjects and 
objects, which are called security clearance and security classification respectively. Security 
labels cannot be changed once they are assigned. Users do not have control over security labels. In 
order to gain access, users must first be authorised by the DAC access matrix, then pass the BLP 
MAC rules: 
o Simple-Security Property: subjects can read object o only ifA(s) ~A( a). 
(;) *-Property: subjects can write object o only ifA(s):::: A( a). 
Note: A denotes the security label. Write denotes "append" or "write only", and must not be 
interpreted as "read and write". 
BLP MAC rules are defined as "only if' which means they are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for access. Additional actions, such as create and delete, can be constrained by 
*-Property because they are similar to write. 
Bell-LaPadula model was motivated by the purpose of confidentiality. It limits users to read 
downward (files below user's security level) and write upward (files above user's security level). 
are: 
Another similar model, Biba model was motivated by the purpose of integrity [ 48]. The rules 
• Simple-Integrity Property: subject s can read object o only if ro(s) :::: ro( o ). 
• Integrity *-Property: subjects can write object o only if ro(s) ~ ro( o ). 
Note: ro denotes the integrity label. Write denotes "append" or "write only". 
The central notion is that low-integrity infonnation is not pennitted to flow to high-integrity 
objects, while the opposite is pennitted. BLP model and Biba model can be combined together: 
Gl Subjects can read object o only ifA(s) ~ A(o) and ro(s)::; ro(o). 
• Subjects can write object o only ifA(s) :::: A( o) and ro(s) ~ ro( o ). 
It is called composite model. It is very popular and has been implemented in several operating 
systems, databases and network products. 
1.3 Role Based Access Contro~ 
The notion of Role Based Access Control (RBAC) emerged m the 1970s. It was first 
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formalized by D. Ferraiolo and R. Kuhn in 1992 [6]: Access permissions are assigned to roles and 
roles are assigned to users. As a bridge between permissions and users, role greatly simplifies 
corporate security management. Users are assigned different roles to reflect their positions and 
responsibilities. Roles are assigned different permissions to reflect organizational security policy 
changes. An investigation conducted by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Teclmology) on 
the security requirements of twenty eight different organizations showed that organizations desired 
access privileges be based on the position held by each person within the organization [ 19]. 
Organizations would like to maintain the access privileges in accordance with its security policies 
rather than at personal discretion. RBAC has the flexibility to meet these criteria. 
UNIX/Linux users often find that the concept of UNIX/Linux group is similar to that of 
RBAC. The primary difference between groups and roles is that a group is only a collection of 
users. You need to go through the whole system to collect all the permissions that have been 
assigned to a group, for instance, in the UNIX file system, the administrator needs to traverse all 
the files in the file system to gather the permissions of a user/group, which will take a very long 
time. A role is both a collection of users on one side and a collection of permissions on the other 
side. Roles effectively and dynamically connect the two. 
Sandhu et al. further classified RBAC into four sub categories, RBACO, RBAC1, RBAC2 
and RBAC3 [7]. RBACO is the basic model and the minimal requirement for any system that 
supports RBAC. RBAC1 and RBAC2 both embrace RBACO but extend with different features. 
RBAC3 combines RBAC1 and RBAC2 and, by transitivity, RBACO (Figure 1-1). 
Figure 1-1 RBACO- RBAC3 relations 
There are four elements in RBACO; they are users (U), roles (R), permissions (P) and 
5 
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sessions (S). Permissions and roles are many-to-many relation; users and roles are also 
many-to-many relation. A user could establish one or more sessions with the server. The user is the 
owner of the session and has the full control over it. He/she could have one or more roles active in 
one session at the same time and could dynamically change active roles. A session can only be 
associated with one user (the owner). Therefore a user could have different roles (permissions) 
active at the same time, or in one session at different times. This feature supports the principle of 
least privilege, which requires that a user should be given no more privilege than necessary to 
perfonn a job. 
RBAC1 extends RBACO with the concept of hierarchies. Hierarchy is a very common 
requirement of the management of large organizations. It mirrors the inner security structure of 
large organizations. Figure 1-2 shows a typical diagram of role hierarchies. The role member is in 
the lowest level. Database administrator and programmer are in the middle and inherit all the 
privileges from member. Supervisor is the highest-level role and inherits all the privileges of 
database administrator and programmer. Sometimes we need to limit the scope of inheritance. 
For instance, database administrator and programmer want to keep some of the permissions 
private and prevent supervisor from inheriting them. This can be solved by adding new roles into 
the structure (Figure 1-3, database administrator' and programmer). Under this situation, 
database administrator' and programmer' are often referred to as private roles. 
Figure 1-2 an example of role hierarchies 
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Figure 1-3 an example of private roles 
RBAC2 extends RBACO with the concept of constraints. The first and most frequently 
mentioned constraint is mutually exclusive roles, i.e., the same user can be assigned at most one 
role at one time from a set of mutually exclusive roles. This feature supports the notion of 
separation of duties. For instance, examiner and examinee are two mutually exclusive roles and 
they cannot be assigned to one person at the same time. An extension of this model is that the 
mutually exclusive permissions cannot be assigned to the same role at the same time. The second 
constraint is cardinality constraint, i.e., one role can have only a specific maximum number of 
members and vice versa. For instance, there is only one person who has the role of manager in a 
department at one time. Correspondingly, the number of roles a permission can be assigned to can 
have cardinality constraint to control the distribution of powerful permissions. The third constraint 
is prerequisite roles, i.e., a user can be assigned role B if the user already has role A. This 
constraint is based on competency; a user should have a junior role in order to be assigned a senior 
role. However, if the same person has been assigned two or more identities, or the same operation 
could be accomplished by two different permissions, then separation and cardinality constraint 
become ineffective. 
RBAC3 combines RBAC 1 and RBAC2 together. This could introduce several new issues. 
Constraints can be applied to role hierarchies. For instance, in Figure 1-3 database administrator' 
and programmer' can be declared as mutually exclusive. They cannot be inherited by the same 
role or assigned to the same user. Real programmers should be assigned the role programmer', not 
programmer. Therefore, the role programmer should have a maximum cardinality constraint of 
zero. 
7 
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1.3.1 RBAC Extensions 
Apart from the above basic RBAC models, there are several extensions ofRBAC. 
Parameterised RBAC appends parameters to roles. The privileges of roles can be refined 
during activation time by setting the parameter values. For example, instead of specifying every 
fom1 of the privileges such as read haematology, read biochemistry and read microbiology, we 
can specify the privileges in the form of read(name), where name can be replaced by haematology, 
biochemist1y and microbiology. Parameterised RBAC also introduces problems for role 
hierarchies and constraint. Parent role parameters should not be significantly different from child 
roles and administrators need more information than the role name to place constraint. 
Different from common RBAC models which allow subjects to do, obligation policy requires 
subjects must or must not do to the targets. Ponder is a RBAC policy language that supports 
obligation [14]. 
Positive pemussions specify what a subject is allowed to do. On the contrary, negative 
permissions specify what a subject cannot do. Combining them together could be thorny because 
some actions can be both allowed and prohibited at the same time. This involves a priority order 
of the rules. 
Centralised RBAC system is unable to meet the new requirements of distributed large scale 
organisations. For instance, it is difficult to know the permissions of a role assigned to a user from 
a different security domain; different portions of organisations need to maintain and modify 
security policies locally. Many efforts have tried to extend RBAC to support decentralised 
management [2][33]. 
1.3.2 Delegation 
Delegation facilitates decentralised management of RBAC by allowing a user/role to 
authorise other users/roles with part/all of the privileges the user/role has. Delegator is the subject 
who gives out privileges and delegatee is the subject who receives privileges. For instance, Alice 
grants Bob the role employee. Alice is the delegator, Bob is the delegatee and employee is the 
delegated role. Delegation is closely related with revocation, i.e., the delegator can revoke a 
specific privilege from the delegatee. 
Delegations are finely divided into several sub-categories [31 ]. 
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o Permanence. The delegator permanently delegates all his roles to the delegatee. Delegator 
loses his roles and delegatee receives the full power of the delegator's roles. Delegator 
cannot take his roles back, except through the help of the administrator. On the contrary, 
temporary delegation allows the delegator to delegate his roles for a short period. After 
that time, delegation expires and delegator regains all his prior roles. 
o Monotonicity. A monotonic delegation means delegator maintains all of his/her roles and 
pennissions after delegation. A non-monotonic delegation means delegator loses all of 
his/her roles and pennissions after delegation. Delegator can regain his/her roles and 
permissions by revoking the delegation. 
Q Totality. Total delegation delegates all the permissions of a role to the delegatee. Partial 
delegation only delegates a subset of the pennissions of a role to the delegatee. 
e Administration. In the self-acted delegation, the responsibility of the administration of 
delegation is on the delegator himself. In the agent-acted delegation, the administration is 
on a nominated third party. 
e Levels of delegation. Delegation level can be specified by a number. Single step 
delegation prevents the delegated privileges to be further delegated. Multi-step delegation 
allows the delegatee to further delegate the privileges to other subjects. 
• Multiple delegations. This type of delegation allows the delegator to delegate a role to 
multiple subjects at the same time. 
• Agreements. Bilateral agreement is a contract, which contains the specification of the 
delegation, accepted by both the delegator and the delegatee. On the other hand, unilateral 
agreement is a one-way decision. The delegator decides to delegate the role and the 
delegatee has to accept it. 
e Revocation. Revocation is divided into cascading revocation and grant-dependency 
revocation. Cascading revocation is the indirect revocation as a result of the revocation of 
other roles. A supporting role is the role that the delegatee owns prior to delegation. If the 
delegatee loses the supporting role, then he loses the delegated role. A sponsoring role is 
the role that the delegator owns in order to delegate. If the delegator loses the sponsoring 
role, then he loses the ability to delegate, the delegatee loses the delegated role and further 
delegations are also revoked. Grant-dependent delegation only permits the delegator to 
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revoke the delegation. Grant-independent delegation permits anyone who has the 
sponsoring role to revoke the delegation. 
1.4 Summary 
DAC allows the owner to manage his resource at his own will. MAC compels the resources 
to be managed by the system regardless whoever the owner is. RBAC supplements the drawbacks 
of both DAC and MAC. Users assigned roles and roles are assigned privileges. This change brings 
more flexibility. The basic concept of RBAC is extended with hierarchies, constraint, parameters 
and delegation. Traditional RBAC is centrally administered and satisfies the security requirements 
of locally managed organizations. However, in a distributed computing environment, where 
organizations need to frequently cooperate and coordinate with each other, a decentralised 
mechanism is desperately needed. 
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2 Distributed Access Control 
2.1 New challenges and research issues 
Most traditional access control systems depend on access matrix [ 46] and RBAC. Access 
matrix and RBAC are effective where identities and privileges are managed in one central point 
and the trust relationships are straightforward. However, in a distributed environment, where the 
users, the privileges and the objects are scattered and managed in different locations, access matrix 
and RBAC become inept to meet the increasingly complex security requirements [1]. For instance, 
organizations need to specify complicated situations such as time and location constraints, 
advanced RBAC models and dynamic trust relationships, etc in the policy. These cannot be clearly 
described by an access matrix. Some systems hard code the access control component into the 
application, this approach is inflexible because the only method to update the policies is to rewrite, 
recompile and redeploy the application, this is time consuming and costly. The major issues and 
requirements are observed and discussed in [4][10][9][32]: 
• Large scale. The interconnected systems are composed of applications, resources and 
users from various locations that are geographically dispersed. Some of them are already 
known and trusted, some are unknown and therefore not trusted. 
• Autonomous. As there is no central control point, each security domain should be able to 
independently specify, manage, and enforce its own security policies. 
• Complex policies. Traditional access control mechanisms only consider simple conditions 
such as username/password. Nowadays we need to express more complex conditions such 
as time, location restriction, users' attributes, etc. 
• Evolution. Because the nature of large scale, applications and systems change consistently. 
Security policies need to evolve accordingly to adapt to the changes. 
• Cross security boundaries. Because of the nature of large scale, distributed systems often 
span several security domains. These domains maintain their own access control systems, 
potentially different RBAC systems. A mechanism must be developed to connect and 
coordinate these different RBACs. 
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o Decentralisation. The management of the access control system must be decentralised. 
Currently, the most popular mechanism is delegation which is not perfect. New 
mechanisms are required. 
2.2 Decentralisation and delegation 
Contrary to conventional centralised administration, the decentralised administration of trust 
is to administer users and their privileges in different locations. Until now, most of the existing 
solutions depend heavily on delegation (31 ]. The central notion of delegation is that a subject 
(delegator) can grant a subset of his privileges to another subject (delegatee), and the delegatee 
can further delegate the privileges to other subjects. Delegation facilitates decentralisation of 
administration by spreading privileges. 
However, delegation has been criticised [ 1 0], the major disadvantages of delegation are: 
o The identities of the subjects (both delegators and delegatees) must be known in advance. 
e The delegator must delegate no more than what he/she has, and the privileges must be 
known in advance. 
However, sometimes the identities of the delegators cannot be known. Also under certain 
situations, delegators do not own the privileges. For instance, according to The Medical Records 
Confidentiality Act (15], anonymised patients' data can be disclosed to researchers from a certified 
Health Information Service for research purposes only. Researchers have certificates from the 
Health Information Service to prove their identities. A Health Infommtion Service is further 
certified by a national health authority. The identity of the Health Information Service cannot be 
known in advance and it does not have the privileges to access patients' record. Therefore 
delegation is unable to solve this kind of problems. A new approach is desperately demanded. 
2.3 Thesis contribution 
In this thesis, we present a new trust conveyance model, trust empowerment, to compensate 
for the disadvantages of delegation. The core principle of trust empowerment is that the identities 
of the delegators do not have to be known in advance but they are proved by their attributes. The 
delegators do not have to possess all the privileges in order to grant them. This new mechanism is 
embodied through our proposed trust policy language, which is partly based on the achievements 
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of XACML [13]. The credibility of the subjects is totally and finely controlled by the service 
provider. A corresponding compliance checker is also developed for the policy language. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related work on distributed access 
control. Chapter 3 discusses the definition of the trust policy language. Chapter 4 discusses the 
compliance checker. Chapter 5 presents an application case study. Chapter 6 discusses a series of 
scenarios and solutions. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and draws out future work. 
2.4 Distributed RBACs 
2.4.1 PERMIS 
The PERMIS (Privilege and Role Management Infrastructure Standards) project [11][12] is a 
role based access control infrastructure that is based on X.509 Attribute Certificates (AC). 
Attribute Certificate was first introduced by ANSI and standardised in the fourth edition of 
ISO/ITU-T X.509 Reco111111endation [60]. It is the certificate format of Privilege Management 
Infrastructure (PMI). PMI is similar to PKI (Public Key Infrastructure); the major difference is 
that PMI is to authorisation while PKI is to authentication. Public key certificate stores a user's 
name and the public key; an attribute certificate (AC) stores a user's name and privilege attributes 
assigned to him. In PMI, the issuer of the attribute certificate is called the Attribute Authority 
(AA). The root of trust of PMI is called the Source of Authority (SOA). SO As may delegate their 
powers of authorisation to subordinate AAs. The AA has an attribute certificate revocation list 
(ACRL) that contains all the revoked attribute certificates. PMI and AC are to some extent similar 
to discretionary access controls (DAC), because the owner of the resource can grant users access 
right by issuing them attribute certificate. 
PERMIS supports RBACO. On the one side, permissions are stored in ACs and granted to 
roles. Permissions are the attributes contained in the AC, and the holder is the role. On the other 
side, roles are stored in ACs and granted to users. Roles are the attributes contained in the AC, and 
the holder is the user. PERMIS also supports RBACl. By storing junior roles in the AC and 
assigning it to a senior role, roles are inherited in a hierarchical way. PERMIS supports delegation 
by appending an integer in the AC; the integer indicates the depth of permitted delegation. 
The PERMIS architecture is consisted of a Privilege Allocator (PA) and privilege verification 
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system. The SOA and AA use PA to issue attribute certificates to users and sign the PMI policies. 
The SOA and AA store the roles as attributes in the certificate and put the AC into the publicly 
accessible LDAP (Light weight Deirectory Access Protocol) directory. 
PERMIS has developed a Java version of the simplified Access Control Enforcement 
Function (AEF) and Access Control Decision Function (ADF). AEF and ADF are based on the 
Open Group standard AZN API [29) and the ISO Access Control Framework [30). When a user 
accesses the resources, the AEF authenticates him. Then the ADF retrieves his role ACs, according 
to his LDAP DN (Distinguished Name), and the authorisation policy from the public LDAP 
directory. The authorisation decision is based on the requested action, the target resource, the 
permissions of the roles that the user holds and the policies. In PERMIS, Authentication is 
application specific and authorisation is application independent. 
PERMIS has specified a policy language to define the policies. There several types of 
policies. The subject policy specifies the domains of the users; the domains are expressed as an 
LDAP subtree. The SOA policy lists the identities of the SOAs, usually in the fonn of the LDAP 
DNs. All the valid ACs must be signed by one of the SOAs, or one ofthe AAs that is delegated by 
an SOA. The role hierarchy policy specifies the role hierarchies within PMI. The roles are defined 
using type-value pairs as attributes; the types are identified by the globally unique object 
identifiers. The role hierarchy graph is a directed graph rather than a tree, because a role can have 
multiple superior roles and can also inherit from a set of subordinate roles, which cannot be 
represented by a tree. The role assignment policy specifies which roles can be assigned to which 
subjects by which SOAs. The depth of the delegation level of the role can be specified by an 
integer (particularly, integer zero means no delegation). Time constraints can also be applied to 
role assignment. The target policy specifies the target domains. The domains are distinguished by 
LDAP subtrees and are similar to subject domains. The action policy specifies all the valid actions 
that can be performed to the target resources. The action consists of a name and a number of 
arguments. The arguments will be passed into the PERMIS API by the Access Enforcement 
Function (AEF) at runtime. The target access policy consists of a series of target access clauses. 
Each clause contains a specific set of roles to perform the specified actions on the specified targets, 
only if the IF clause could be satisfied. The IF clause contains a series of conditions, a condition 
includes a comparison operator, an operand, and one or more variables/constants. PERMIS 
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supports user-defined operators. 
PERMIS realizes a rigid distributed RBAC system. Roles are assigned to users as attributes 
in ACs by the issuing body. ACs are stored in public directory and can be retrieved by anyone. The 
deficiencies of PERMIS are that it cannot finely control the privileges assigned to users, and the 
issuing body must share the same definition of RBAC with the object domain which is sometimes 
unrealistic. 
2.4.2 OASIS 
OASIS stands for Open Architecture for Secure, Interworking Services. It is a role-based 
access control architecture that facilitates the interoperation between services in a distributed 
environn1ent [2][3]. 
The administration of OASIS roles is intrinsically distributed. Each service maintains its own 
RBAC system. Users are not assigned privileges directly, instead they are assigned roles and roles 
are assigned privileges. Services intemperate via Service Level Agreements (SLA). An SLA is a 
contract between services; it contains role definitions and/or policy information. Services use SLA 
to interpret different RBACs. OASIS is integrated into an active, event-based middleware 
infrastructure. Any change of the environment is notified by a message, therefore role 
activation/deactivation are under supervision and can be reflected in real time [43]. 
Recognizing the limitations of delegation, OASIS builds privilege conveyance mechanism on 
its newly designed mechanism appointment to replace delegation. The central notion of 
appointment is that roles are able to grant roles, which are embedded in appointment certificates, 
to subjects without possessing the target roles, hence enabling subjects to activate more roles. 
The activation of roles is controlled under role activation rules. A role activation rule 
specifies a series of conditions. The conditions include prerequisite roles, appointment credentials 
and environmental constraints. The conditions must be met in order for the corresponding role to 
be activated. A prerequisite role is the role that a subject must have acquired and has activated it 
before activating more roles. An example is that in order to access internal resources, users must 
prove that they are members of the role internal users. Some roles possess the ability to issue 
appointment credentials. With the appointment credentials, and maybe some other credentials 
required by the policy, subjects can activate more roles. The appointment credentials are 
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independent of the activation of the appointer role. The appointer does not have to explicitly 
possess the privileges contained in the appointment credential that he has issued. This is 
understandable because it is a quite common situation in real life. For example, the computer 
administrator in a hospital does not have the privilege to treat the patients, but he could grant the 
corresponding privileges to the patients' doctor. Environmental constraints include user 
independent constraints and user dependent parameters. For instance, user independent constraints 
can be the time of the day or IP address of the computer, user dependent parameters can be the 
name or position of the user. 
OASIS roles are parameterised. This provides fine grained access control. For instance, 
patients can specify who may or may not see their medical records. A patient might express that 
"Clare may not see my medical record". OASIS parameters allow these side conditions to be 
identified and constraint checking permits such exceptions to be enforced. 
Appointment has several advantages over delegation. First of all, privilege conveyance is 
totally under control. In order to complete a task, only those roles that are required during the 
process will be activated, therefore obey the principle of least privilege. Secondly, appointees will 
be assigned a different role from the appointer, which makes cascading delegation irrelevant. 
Thirdly, the appointer could grant privilege to appointee without possessing the privilege. This 
kind of situation is commonly viewed in real life but cannot be accomplished by delegation. 
Fourthly, delegation can be regarded as a special case of appointment, where the appointer can 
only grant a subset of roles that he owns to the appointee. 
The revocation of appointment can be completed by three methods: by the appointer only; by 
anyone in the appointer role; by the rules of the system. Letting the appointer revoke the 
appointment seems to be a natural and straightforward way. But sometimes the appointer is unable 
to revoke, for instance, the appointer has retired or left. A solution is to allow anyone of the users 
who can activate the appointer role to make the revocation. A third method is that if a certain 
condition is met in the system then the appointment will be automatically revoked. These rules can 
be time, tasks and/or sessions. For instance, the appointment could be associated with a period of 
time; it will automatically be revoked after the expiry time. If the appointment is associated with 
some kind of task and the end time of the task is difficult to know in advance, then the revocation 
could be waken by the end of the task. It is especially helpful in a workflow environment. The 
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validation of the appointment can also be based on the appointer or appointee's session. If the 
session of the appointer/appointee ends, then the appointment automatically ends. 
The precondition of OASIS interaction is that all the services are mutually trusted between 
each other. The authors also tried to establish a more common infrastructure to accommodate 
those previously unknown and untrusted services to interact. This remains to be an active research 
area. 
2.4.3 1Po81lder 
Ponder is a declarative, object-oriented policy language as a result of ten years of efforts [ 14]. 
It is aimed to specify security and management policy in distributed environment. It is a flexible, 
expressive and extensible policy language. 
There are several kinds of policies. The authorisation policy defines what a principal of a 
subject domain could do on the targets of the object domain. Figure 2-1 is an example of 
authorisation policy. It says that the members of the NetworkAdmin domain are authorised to load, 
remove, enable or disable objects in the Nregionlswitches domain. 
Inst auth+ switchPolicyOps { 
Subject /NetworkAdmin; 
Target <Policy1> /Nregion/switches; 
Action load(), remove(), enable(), disable(); 
Figure 2-1 example of positive authorisation policy 
The information filtering policy is used to modify the input/output parameters in an action. Its 
purpose is to restrict the information flow. Filters can only be applied to positive actions. 
Delegation policy defines the transfer level of access rights. It records the grantee that receives the 
delegated privileges. It can be associated with an authorisation policy, which contains the relevant 
subject, target and action. The refrain policy defines what actions the subjects cannot perform on 
the objects. It is similar to negative authorisation policy. The difference is that refrain policy is 
actively enforced by subjects because subjects might suspect the safety of the objects; negative 
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authorisation policy is passively enforced by the servtce controller. Obligation policy is 
event-triggered and defines the actions that must be performed by the subjects on the targets. 
Figure 2-2 is an obligation policy that specifies the user must be disabled after three consecutive 
login failures. 
Inst oblig loginFailure { 
on 
subject 
target <userT> 
do 
Figure 2-2 obligation policy 
J*loginfail(userid); 
s=/NRegion/SecAdmin; 
t=/NRegion/users " { userid} ; 
!.disable()-> s.log(userid); 
Constraint policy specifies the conditions under which the target policies are valid. A basic 
constraint policy is for single target policy and a meta policy is for a group of policies. Composite 
policy combines several related policies together to form a group policy, either by the same 
subject, target or other criteria. It facilitates policy management in large, complex enterprises. 
Role policy is a special case of group policy, in which all policies share the same subject. Roles 
can form hierarchies. They can have complex relationships between each other. For instance, a 
secretary role must mail a report to the manager role every Monday. 
2.5 Policy based approaches 
2.5.1 PolicyMaker and KeyNote 
M. Blaze et a!. summarized their work on trust management in [1]. The concept of trust 
management was first introduced in the PolicyMaker system [ 4] and was defined as "a unified 
approach to specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships; it allows 
direct authorization of security-critical actions". 
A trust management system has five basic components: 
8 Action, which is the operation that the subject performs on the object. 
e Principal, which is the subject who has been legally granted some permission to perform 
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an action on the object. 
® Policy, which defines the regulations that must be conformed to for the subjects to 
perform the actions. 
8 Credential, which allows subjects to delegate privileges to other subjects. 
e Compliance checker, which generates an authorisation decision based on the given 
policy, a set of credentials, and a requested action. 
There should be standard languages to describe the action, policy, and credential. The 
languages are shared by all the trust-management applications. The security configurations of the 
applications have exactly the same syntactic and semantic structure. Trust management unifies the 
notions of security policy, credentials, access control and authorisation. Unlike traditional 
certificates, which combine keys and names, trust management certificates combine keys and 
authorisations. The issuer delegates the capability to the holder through the certificate. Trust 
management systems are inherently extensible for distributed systems and versatile for many 
applications. 
Trust management sums up distributed access control as "does the set C of credentials prove 
that the request r complies with the local security policy P?" [ 4]. The compliance checker takes in 
(r, C, P) and returns a result of compliance checking. The most important contribution of trust 
management is "a general purpose, application-independent algorithm for checking proofs of 
compliance" [ 4]. 
PolicyMaker was the first demonstration of trust management. It was introduced in [4] and its 
compliance-checking algorithm was later carried out in [20]. Credentials and policies of 
PolicyMaker are fully programmable and they are consisted of assertions. Assertions are 
two-value pairs in the form of if, s ), where f is a programme that describes the privileges and to 
whom they are being granted, s is the source of authority. In policies, s is always the preserved 
keyword policy, and in credentials, s is the public key of the issuer. Assertions can be written in 
any progranm1ing languages. The receiving end of the assertions must have an interpreter of the 
language in order to safely interpret them because credentials could be issued by untrusted 
authorities. A language named AWKWARD [4], which is a safe version of AWK [62], had been 
developed. 
PolicyMaker does not assent to sticking on one particular language to write the assertions. 
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The advantage is that all the effort that "has gone into designing, analysing and implementing the 
PolicyMaker compliance-checking algorithm will not have to be redone every time an assertion 
language is changed or a new language is introduced." The proof of compliance and the language 
design are independent of each other and can be done separately. 
The proof of compliance checking of PolicyMaker is consisted of a method of inter-assertion 
communication and a method for determining a result of success/failure. The inter-assertion 
communication is done via a write-only data structure. Firstly, a blackboard is created with only 
the request r on it. Then all the assertions (f;, s;) are run for one or more times. Each time an 
assertion runs it appends one or more records (i, s;, Ru) to the blackboard, where Ru is an action 
that source s; approves; fi understands the meaning of Ru but PolicyMaker does not. Finally, the 
blackboard will contain a record indicating the legitimateness of the request r. The authors had 
provided a mathematical formulation and proof of problem undecidability. 
A limitation of PolicyMaker is that it only supports monotonic (non-negative) assertions. 
KeyNote [5] was designed according to the same criteria but has made several improvements 
compared to its predecessor PolicyMaker. KeyNote system engine includes more functions than 
PolicyMaker and mitigates the burden of applications. KeyNote also requires that credentials and 
policy be written in a specific KeyNote language, which gains more efficiency and interoperability. 
The KeyNote assertion language is a simple and loops-restricted language; it has a minimal-sized 
interpreter. 
Here is the basic structure of the assertion in KeyNote and an example: 
<Assertion>:: <VersionField>? <AuthField> <LicenseesField>? 
<LocaiConstantsField>? <ConditionsField>? 
<CommentField>? <SignatureField>? 
Note: the notation"?" means zero or one repetition 
Figure 2-3 KeyNote assertion structure 
KeyNote-Version: 2 
Local-Constants: Alice="DSA:440 1 ff92" 
Bob="RSA:d1234f' 
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Authorizer: "RSA:abc123" 
Licensees: Alice II Bob 
Conditions: (app_domain == "RFC822-EMAIL") && 
(address == "mab@keynote.research.att.com") 
Signature: "RSA-SHA 1 :213354f9" 
Figure 2-4 KeyNote assertion example 
A KeyNote evaluator takes in a set of credentials, policies, requester public keys, an action 
environment and returns an application-defined string (usually authorised/denied) to the calling 
application. The action environment contains a set of attributes and is similar to the Unix shell 
environment. 
KeyNote adopts a depth-first search (DFS) algorithm that recursively tries to satisfy both the 
Conditions field and the Licensees Key expression of at least one of the policy assertions. 
KeyNote's evaluation model is a subset ofPolicyMaker's and is therefore guaranteed by the latter. 
At last, an assertion graph, which is composed of policy assertions and the issuer of the credentials, 
will be created to approve or deny the request. 
KeyNote also has non-negative credential restriction as PolicyMaker. 
Trust management models are based on rigorous delegation, where subjects cannot delegate 
more than they have; de legators and de legatees must be known and identified by their public keys. 
2.5.2 XACML 
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Lauguage) is an OASIS standard that describes 
a general-purpose access control policy language and an access control decision request/response 
language in XML format [13)[16]. 
The access control decision language lets the user ask whether a specific action is allowed or 
not by sending a message and receiving the response. The response contains one of the following 
four values: 
(i) Permit. The action is allowed. 
(i) Deny. The action is not allowed. 
o Indetem1inate. An error occurred or more infommtion is required to make a decision. 
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o Not Applicable. The service is unable to answer the request. 
A user makes a request to a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP sends the user's 
attributes, the resource's attributes, the requested action, together with some other relevant 
information to a Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP checks the input against the relevant 
policy and returns the answer to PEP. PEP will allow or deny the request based on the decision. 
The policy is written in XACML policy language. Each policy document contains one 
Policy/PolicySet root element. A Policy/PolicySet contains several Rules or other Policy/PolicySet. 
To make an access control decision, the PDP first locates the Targets that apply to the request, 
evaluates each Rule related to the Target. Then a PEP or PDP extracts attributes from the request, 
the resources and the environment through AttributeDesignator or AttributeSelector. Multiple 
attributes are stored in Bags. The PEP/PDP use system or user-defined functions to compare the 
attributes according to the Rules and return a result. The final decision is made according to the 
combined result of all the rules via Policy Combining Algorithms or Rule Combining Algorithms. 
The drawbacks of XACML are that it does not integrate RBAC, users have to define and 
include their own RBAC; also it does not support delegation, which constrains scalability of the 
system. 
2.6 Summary 
Table 2-1 summary of related work on distributed access control 
Support Decentralisation Fine-grained access Comment 
RBAC mechanism control 
PERMIS Yes Uniform RBAC is No Roles are stored in 
administered in different the certificate as 
locations attributes 
OASIS Yes Through Appointment Partially Uses appointment 
to replace 
delegation 
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Policy Maker No Through rigid delegation Partially. Access drew the concept of 
and KeyNote rights are directly trust management 
assigned to subjects 
XACML No No Yes. Via attributes of OASIS standard 
both requester and 
resource 
Ponder Yes Through domain policy Partially 
and delegation policy 
As we can see from the above table, most mechanisms adopt delegation as the solution of 
decentralised management of trust. Delegation is restricted because it requires that the identities of 
the delegator and delegatee must be known in advance. OASIS introduces a new decentralised 
mechanism called appointment. More research is needed in this area. 
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3 Trust and the Mojoy Trust Policy language 
3.1 Foundation of trust 
The concept of trust has been addressed within many disciplines, including philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, transaction economics and organization theory. It has widely 
acknowledged that trust is complex and multidimensional [10][27]. 
In this thesis, we discuss trust in a distributed computing environment. Trust can be generic 
description of the specific subject. Trust can be particular privileges of a subject. Trust can be 
transferred from one subject to another. Service providers trust subjects by allowing them to 
access protected services and/or resources. 
3.1.1 Initialization of trust 
There are several ways for a subject to start its trust relation with the unknown world. 
Whatsoever, the subject has to trust some other subjects unconditionally at the very beginning. 
Recommendation 
In real life, recommendation is the most common method to help making a decision. 
Recommendation is usually obtained from someone familiar, or the media, newspaper, etc. The 
credibility of recommendation highly depends on the source. It could be unreliable because it is 
very subjective. 
Reputation 
Reputation is used to establish trust between unfamiliar parties. It does not require prior 
contact experience with each other. It is a collective opinion of the public about an unknown party. 
Therefore it is more reliable than recommendation. But it is vulnerable to collusion and can be 
deliberately manipulated. 
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Experience 
Trust is closely related to previous experiences because experiences can be good evaluation 
criteria to predict the outcome of future interactions. Experiences may be consisted of vague 
memory or concrete records of transaction history. Depending on the knowledge learned from past 
experiences, the level of trust may increase or decrease. Experiences can also be gained and shared 
by some other trusted parties. In this case, it is similar to recommendation. 
Root of trust 
An entity needs to first trust at least one subject in order to establish trust with more subjects. 
That particular subject(s) is called root of trust. The root of trust is recognized by its identity. This 
trust relationship is usually unconditional and uncaused. For instance, the administrator has full 
power over the whole system, whoever he/she is. The subject trusts the root of trust only to a 
limited scope. 
3.1.2 Conveyance of trust 
Trust can be transferred from one subject to another. It can be disclosed to third parties. This 
facilitates a subject to establish trust with a previously unknown subject through some already 
familiar subjects. 
Subjects are distinguished by public/private key pairs. A public key is associated with only 
one private key and vice versa. The probability that two subjects having the same public/private 
key pair is so tiny that it is negligible. The public key can be publicised to everyone so that anyone 
(even those who are totally untrusted strangers) can know the public key and the owner. The 
private key is kept secret. A subject proves his/her ownership of the public key by successfully 
decrypting/encrypting a particular message using the private key. A subject can have multiple 
public/private key pairs. This means those systems that require users to be identified by their 
identities cannot merely depend on public/private keys; there must be some extra methods to 
associate the identity with the public/private key, for instance, requiring ID card before allocating 
public/private key. 
Trust can be defined as properties. A property can be a generic statement of a subject, such as 
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attributes. The meaning of the statement is understood by the receiving subject, the interpretation 
accords to some commonly accepted rules. For instance, Alice is a doctor in a hospital. She is 
approved by the hospital. When she goes to another hospital, the new hospital finds out that she is 
a doctor in the previous hospital and grants her corresponding privileges according to her former 
position. It is very likely that Alice does not have the same responsibilities in those two hospitals. 
The common rule negotiated by the two parties to interpret the roles is known as Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) [17]. SLA is a bilateral contract that specifies the role defmitions. With SLA, 
roles can be created remotely according to the same definition and be revoked synchronously in 
real time. A property can also be a particular capability. The capability precisely describes what 
the subject can do on the specific targets. The meaning of the capability is clearly defined by the 
original authority and cannot be misinterpreted. For instance, a capability could be "Alice can read 
the public resource in hospital A". This capability must be interpreted uniformly at any location. 
Alice cannot have more privilege than the capability. 
Properties can be owned, obtained and/or controlled. The subject who owns the properties is 
the owner. The owner can grant the properties to any trusted subjects, i.e. grantees. The grantees 
therefore obtain the properties from the owner. The original owner decides whether the grantees 
can further grant the properties to other subjects. The subject who controls the properties is the 
controller. The controllers do not own the properties and thereby cannot perform the actions 
indicated by the properties. But they can grant the properties to other subjects therefore those 
subjects could own the properties and legally perform the indicated actions. 
A subject grants properties to another subject in the fom1 of electronic credentials, a.k.a. 
certificate. For instance, X.509 certificate is a widely recognized certificate format. The granting 
subject is the certificate issuer and the receiving subject is the certificate holder. Properties are 
stored in the certificate. The issuer digitally signs the certificate. The digital signature provides 
authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation. The receiving party of the certificate can verify that the 
certificate is from the authentic issuer, the content of the certificate has not been tampered, and the 
subject is the true holder. Integrity can be verified by recalculating and matching the message 
digest value of the certificate. The public key of the issuer must be known in advance to verify the 
authenticity of the certificate. It is done by re-computing the digital signature using the issuer's 
public key. With a digital signature, the issuer cannot deny the issuance of the certificate, because 
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no one could sign the same signature without owning the specific private key. The holder of the 
certificate could be verified by successfully encrypting/decrypting a random message. 
The issuer uses certificate to convey his/her trust to the certificate holder. The holder uses the 
certificate to prove his/her credibility to third parties. The certificate could be disclosed to anyone. 
They are tamperproof. The propagator of the certificate could be anyone other than the 
issuer/holder. Certificate can be used to justify the validity of other credentials. For instance, Alice 
is a doctor. She has a credential from the hospital to prove her identity and position. The hospital 
is further certified by the National Health Service (NHS). In this case, Alice can present the 
hospital's certificate, which is issued by NHS, to help confirm her identity and position. A trust 
chain is created from NHS to Alice. 
3.1.3 Decentralised administration of trust 
In a highly distributed computing environment, the administration of trust should be 
disseminated to many subjects who are not the original owner/controller of trust. The mostly 
commonly adopted decentralisation mechanism is delegation. The owner of the properties grants a 
subset of the properties to another subject, the owner is known as the grantor/delegator, the 
receiver is known as grantee/delegatee. The grantee can further grant the properties to other 
subjects. Delegation level (i.e. how far the properties can be transferred) is controlled by the 
delegator. 
However, sometimes the subject does not always own the properties before delegation. For 
instance, the system administrator can create new users and assign relevant privileges to specific 
users. The users can execute system operations, but the administrator does not have the privilege 
to execute system operations. 
We have designed a new decentralised administration mechanism, trust empowerment. The 
service provider defines the trust regulation in its local policy. In the policy, the server specifies 
what subjects own/control what properties, whether the properties can be further granted to other 
subjects and how far they can be transferred. The subjects can be specified either by their 
identities or properties. Different server keeps its private personal policy. The same subject trusted 
at one server may not be trusted at another. 
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3.1.4 Variation o1 ~rust 
Trust is dynamic. It changes as environment varies. It evolves as knowledge and experiences 
accumulate. Previously trusted subjects may become untrusted. For instance, trust is limited by 
time constraint. A certificate is only valid within its validity time period. After that period, the 
certificate will become invalid. Furthermore, the certificate could be revoked before its expiry 
time. A consequence of this annulment is that all derived trust depending on the trusted properties 
of the certificate will become invalid. Previously untrusted subjects may become trusted. For 
instance, the subject provides extra evidence to satisfy the security criteria. The credibility of the 
subject could be affected by outside changes. For instance, the common rule, SLA (Service Level 
Agreement), used to interpret the roles changes. As a consequence, the subject loses the privileges 
to access the resource. 
Service providers set rules in their local policies to filter requests. The rules describe the 
conditions that the subjects must meet in order to be trusted and the privileges they can obtain 
once become trusted. Conditions could consist of subjects' identities, attributes, capabilities and/or 
environmental parameters. Privileges could consist of attributes, capabilities and controls. 
Conditions and privileges are many-to-many relationship. 
Trust could evolve. As the server's experience with the subject accrues, the trust level of the 
subject could increase/decrease. The same subject with the same properties under the same policy 
could gain/lose privileges according to the accrued experience. 
3.2 Trust policy language 
Sandhu engineered the structure of security into four layers. From top to bottom, they are 
policy, model, architecture and mechanism [33]. Policy is the high-level organizational 
requirements and mechanism is the implementation of the security design. 
M. Blaze et a!. proposed a trust management infrastructure to solve the trust issues in the 
distributed systems. It contains the following elements [4]: 
fP Certificates, a.k.a. electronic credentials. They are used to transfer trust information 
between entities. 
0 Policy, which is stored and trusted locally. It expresses the local security regulation, 
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trusted authorities, trusted relationships, etc. 
• Compliance checker, which is a computer programme that takes in user certificates and 
local policy, examines them, and generates an access decision, which usually is grant or 
deny. 
Policies and certificates are written in a language that can be understood by all the entities 
involved in the system. The infrastructure of Trust management has been widely accepted and is 
considered to be a correct direction. 
Recognizing the complex nature of trust, we develop a policy language to describe the basic 
entities and their trust relationships. We present the syntax, semantics and an implementation of 
the proposed policy language in this chapter. The syntax is expressed in BNF (Backus Naur Form) 
[61]. The trust policy language could be implemented via various ways. XML is a good format to 
express the policy language; it has been adopted by PERMIS [12], XACML [13] and Akenti [42]. 
The advantages of using XML are: 
• XML is human readable, easy to maintain and platform independent. 
• The syntax of XML document can be validated against a schema!DTD file, which could 
help reduce format errors. 
• There are a number of handy tools and libraries to operate XML document. 
An XML schema file will be provided as the definition of the policy language. 
3.2.1 Why need a policy language 
There are a number of ways to specify, represent and administer policy [17]. Obviously, 
natural languages are the best choice but they are inappropriate because of their ambiguous nature. 
Efforts have been made to visualise security policies [37][38]. Some components such as 
role-privilege mapping and hierarchies are straightforward and can be easily done. But some other 
areas such as constraint and conflict are still difficult to visualise. Many RBAC models use formal, 
logic-based languages because they are suited for formal reasoning, i.e. the semantics and syntax 
can be formally checked and analysed by a programme. 
According to our requirements, policy is used to express our new trust model of trust 
empowerment, describe the trust relationships between different entities, support various RBAC 
models, and implement fine-grained access control. Access matrix, ACL and database are not 
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expressive enough. The ideal choice is a logic-based language which IS simple, easy and 
expressive. 
A policy language is not a programming language. It does not have to have loop/sequence 
clauses. It has subjects, objects and actions as the basic elements. It describes the conditions under 
which the subjects are trusted. It associates the conditions with privileges that the subjects could 
possess. In a nutshell, the policy language describes the trust relationships between subjects. 
Advantages and disadvantages 
The advantages of policy based access control over other approaches have been discussed in 
[39][ 40], the conclusion is that policy based access control is the best choice for distributed 
environment. Policy is separated from the application. It is independent of the application and can 
be updated dynamically to reflect frequent security requirement changes. Policy is portable and 
can be reused between different applications. The enforcement is automatically carried out via the 
programme. Policies are powerful enough to express complex situations such as fine-grained 
access control, environmental constraints, advanced RBAC models and intricate trust relationships. 
Policies can be distributed and uniformly enforced. These advantages clearly reveal that policy 
based mechanism is ideal for distributed access control. 
Policy based access control has its disadvantages. All the systems involved must be able to 
understand the language which is sometimes difficult to accomplish in a widely distributed 
environment. Different organizations have different requirements, some require a simple language 
and others require a complex one, an all-purpose language is hard to design. A compliance checker 
is needed to process the certificates and policies. Of course the compliance checker should be able 
to understand all the possible formats, which is very difficult, if possible, to achieve. 
3.2.2 Subject 
Syntax: 
subjects::= subject {subject} I any_subject 
subject::= public_ key 
public_ key::= string 
issuers ::=subjects 
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holders ::=subjects 
Description: 
A subject is an entity that performs actions in a system; it can be a user, a program or a server. 
A subject is distinguished by its public key. The public key is computed by a certain algorithm and 
specific parameters. The public key is encoded into a readable string through an algorithm such as 
BASE64. Subjects is a set that consists of one or more subject or any subject. Any subject denotes 
any legal and possible subject. Issuers and holders are special subjects. Issuers sign the certificate 
and holders own the certificate. A subject proves its authenticity by providing evidence of owning 
the corresponding private key. This could be done by several ways, such as encrypting/decrypting 
a randomly generated message. Whether the same subject could hold multiple public/private key 
pairs is not of our concern. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name=" Subjects"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:choice> 
<xs:element ref="Subject" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element ref="AnySubject"/> 
</xs:choice> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name=" Subject"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs :sequence> 
<xs:element ref="PublicKey"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="PublicKey" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="AnySubject"/> 
<xs:element name="Issuers"> 
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<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Subject" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Holders"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs :sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Subject" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs :element> 
3.2.3 Attribute 
Syntax: 
attributes::= attribute {attribute } I any_attribute 
attribute::= name value 
name : := string 
value ::=string 
Description: 
Attribute is generic description of a subject. An attribute is a name and value pair. The name 
and value are of string types. For instance, "Alice is a student" could be represented as 
"name=Alice, position=student". A role could also be stored as an attribute, for example, 
"role=user". The meaning of the attribute is interpreted by the object application. Attributes is a 
set that consists of one or more attribute or any attribute. Any attribute denotes any legal and 
possible attribute. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Attributes"> 
<xs:complexType> 
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<xs:choice> 
<xs:element ref="Attribute" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element name=" Any Attribute"/> 
</xs:choice> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name=" Attribute"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs :sequence> 
<xs:element name="Name" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="Value" type="xs:string"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
3.2.4 Capability 
Syntax: 
capabilities ::=capability { capability } 
capability : := targets actions 
targets : := target { target } I any_ target 
actions::= action {action} I any_action 
target : := string 
action ::=string 
Description: 
Capabilities is a set that consists of one or more capability. A capability is what a subject can 
do on specific target. A capability consists of targets and actions. Targets consists of one or more 
target or any target. In the current version, a target is a string. In the future, we are going to define 
target in Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) format. URI is a string of characters for identifying an 
abstract or physical resource [52]. URI can be finely classified into Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL) and Unifonn Resource Name (URN) [51]. The former represents a resource by its current 
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location and access method. The latter represents a resource by its globally unique name and can 
be persistent even if the resource becomes unavailable. Any target denotes any legal and possible 
target. Actions consists of one or more action or any action. An action is application specific and 
must be understood by the object application. It is usually encoded into a readable string. Any 
action denotes any legal and possible action. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Capabilities"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Capability" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs: sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Capability"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Targets"> 
<xs:element ref=" Actions"> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Targets"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:choice> 
<xs:element ref="Target" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element ref="AnyTarget"/> 
</xs:choice> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Actions"> 
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<xs:complexType> 
<xs:choice> 
<xs:element ref=" Action" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element ref="AnyAction"/> 
</xs:choice> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Target" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name=" AnyTarget"/> 
<xs:element name=" Action" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="AnyAction"/> 
3.2.5 Control 
Syntax: 
controls : := control { control } 
control ::=attributes I capabilities 
Description : 
Controls is a set that consists of one or more control. Control is a set that consists of 
attributes and/or capabilities. Attributes and capabilities are also called properties. Sometimes a 
subject does not own the properties; instead it has control over the properties. This means that the 
controlling subject can grant the properties to other subjects thereby the grantees will own the 
properties and can legally perform the specified actions, but the controlling subject cannot perform 
the same actions. Attributes and capabilities are defined in previous sections. 
Implementation : 
<xs:element name="Controls"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs :sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Control" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
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</xs :element> 
<xs:element name="Control"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:all> 
<xs:element ref=" Attributes"/> 
<xs:element ref="Capabilities"/> 
</xs:all> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
3.2.6 Co1111straint 
Syntax: 
constraints : := constraint { constraint } 
constraint : := time_ constraint I ip _constraint 
time constraint : := start time end time 
- - -
start_ time : := string 
end_time ::=string 
ip_constraint ::=string 
Description : 
Constraints IS a set that consists of one or more constraint. A constraint contains 
environmental parameters, which are in contrast to users' attributes and are independent of users. 
A constraint consists of one time constraint or one IP constraint, or a combination of them. A time 
constraint consists of one start time and one end time. Start time and end time are expressed in the 
form of a string, for instance, "16/10/2004 20:06:00" or "09:00:00". An IP constraint is an 
Internet IP address expressed in the form of a string, for instance, "129.234.198.1" or an IP 
address segment "192.168.0.1/24". 
Implementation : 
<xs:element name="Constraints"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
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<xs:element ref="Constraint" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Constraint"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="TimeConstraint" minOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="IPConstraint" rninOccurs="O"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs :element> 
<xs:element name="TimeConstraint"> 
<xs :complex Type> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="StartTime" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="EndTime" type="xs:string"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs :complexType> 
</xs :element> 
<xs:element name="IPConstraint" type="xs:string"/> 
3.2. 7 Condition 
Syntax: 
conditions ::=condition {condition} 
condition ::= [subjects] [issuers] [holders] [attributes] [capabilities] [constraints] 
Description: 
Conditions is a set that consists of one or more condition. Condition consists of subjects, 
attributes, capabilities, constraints, or any combination of them. Satisfying the conditions set 
means satisfying all the condition. Subjects, issuers, holders, attributes, capabilities and 
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constraints are defined in previous sections. 
A conditions set is associated with one or more privileges sets. A subject must satisfy at least 
one conditions set in order to be trusted. Trusted subjects can be granted the privileges contained 
in the corresponding privileges set. See following sections for more details. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Conditions"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Condition" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Condition"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:all> 
<xs:element ref=" Subjects" rninOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="lssuers" minOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Holders" rninOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref=" Attributes" rninOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Capabilities" minOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Constraints" minOccurs="O"/> 
</xs:all> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
3.2.8 Privilege 
Syntax: 
privileges ::=privilege {privilege } 
privilege ::=attributes I capabilities I controls 
Description: 
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Privileges is a set that consists of one or more privilege. A privilege is what a subject can do 
in a system. A privilege consists of attributes, capabilities, controls, or any combination of them. 
One privileges set is associated with one or more conditions sets. If a subject satisfies the 
associated conditions set, then it gains the privilege contained in the privileges set. Attributes, 
capabilities and controls are defined in previous sections. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Privileges"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Privilege" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Privilege"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:all> 
<xs:element ref="Attributes"/> 
<xs:element ref="Capabilities"/> 
<xs:element ref="Controls"/> 
</xs:all> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
3.2.9 Rule 
Syntax: 
rules : := rule { rule } 
rule : := conditions privileges 
Description: 
Rules is a set that consists of one or more rule. A rule specifies under what condition and to 
what extent a subject can be trusted. A rule consists of conditions and privileges. If a subject 
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satisfies the conditions set, it acquires all the privilege in the privileges set in the same rule. A 
subject could satisfy more than one rule at the same time and thereby gains as many privileges as 
possible. Conditions and privileges are defined in previous sections. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Rules"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Rule" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Rule"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs :sequence> 
<xs:element ref="Conditions"/> 
<xs:element ref="Privileges"/> 
</xs :sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
3.2.10 Policy 
Syntax: 
policy : := version rules [ conditions ] [ privileges ] 
version::= XML name space 
Description: 
The server specifies its security regulation in the form of policy. Policy consists of version, 
rules, conditions and privileges. Conditions and privileges are optional; they are used to define 
common conditions and privileges in order to simplify the structure of the document. Different 
versions of the policies are distinguished by version, which is XML name space. The current 
version of our implementation is http://www.dur.ac.uklchetrXi.huanglmojoyO.J. Conditions and 
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privileges are defined in previous sections. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Policy"> 
<xs :complexType> 
<xs:all> 
<xs:element ref="Rules"/> 
<xs:element ref="Conditions" minOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Privileges" minOccurs="O"/> 
</xs:all> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
3.3 Certificates 
Certificates are used to transfer trust from one subject to another. Trust is defined as a set of 
properties and stored in the certificate. The subject that grants the trust is the certificate issuer and 
the subject that receives the trust is the certificate holder. The issuer digitally signs the certificate. 
The digital signature guarantees the certificate's integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. 
The certificate shares part of the syntax and semantics of the policy. But there are several 
visible differences. 
4i The certificate contains issuer(s) and holder(s); the policy does not. 
e> The certificate is digitally signed by the issuer(s) and can be disclosed to anyone; the 
policy does not bear a digital signature because it is locally trusted, private and cannot 
be divulged. 
e The certificate is restricted by some particular conditions contained in the certificate, for 
instance, validity period; a policy is not limited by a constraint. 
Syntax: 
certificate .. version holders [ attributes ] [ capabilities] [ controls ] conditions Issuers 
signature 
signature::= string 
Description: 
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The certificate consists of version, holders, attributes, capabilities, controls, conditions, 
issuers and signature. Attributes, capabilities and controls are optional. Trust is defined as sets of 
attributes, capabilities and controls. Conditions restricts the validity of the certificate. Holders are 
the subjects who own the trust. Issuers are the subjects who grant the trust to the holders and 
digitally sign the certificate. The signature is a message digest value of the certificate encrypted by 
the issuer's public key, which is usually encoded into a readable string. Version, holders, attributes, 
capabilities, controls, conditions and issuers are defined in previous sections. 
Implementation: 
<xs:element name="Certificate"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:all> 
<xs:element ref="Holders"/> 
<xs:element ref=" Attributes" minOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Capabilities" minOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Controls" rninOccurs="O"/> 
<xs:element ref="Conditions"/> 
<xs:element ref="Issuers"/> 
<xs:element ref="Signature"/> 
</xs:all> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Signature" type="xs:string"/> 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed the foundation of trust. Trust is established via 
recommendation, reputation and experience. The very first trusted subject is called the root of trust. 
Trust can be defined as a set of properties, stored in a certificate and distributed to anyone. Trust 
varies; it can increase/decrease. Most of the traditional mechanisms adopt delegation as the 
decentralised administration mechanism of trust. We have proposed a new mechanism, trust 
empowerment, to overcome the limitations of delegation. The new mechanism is implemented 
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through a policy language and a compliance checker. We have provided the syntax, semantics and 
an XML implementation of the policy language. The XML schema of both the policy and 
certificate is given. 
Chapter 4 The Compliance Checker 
4 The Compliance Checker 
The function of the compliance checker is to check the validity of the certificates, look 
through the local trust policy, find out whether the request meets the policy and could be supported 
by the certificates. The inputs are user's request, user's certificates, local trust policy and 
environmental parameters. The output is a Boolean value indicates whether the request is 
permitted or not. Additional information is also generated, for instance, the conditions that are not 
satisfied and/or extra supportive documents are required, etc. 
4.1 Java and XML 
The compliance checker is written in Java and the policy and certificate are written in XML. 
We need to examine the available programming tools for Java and XML. There are two popular 
APis (Application Programming Interface) available to process XML documents. They are SAX 
(Simple API for XML) and DOM (Document Object Model). SAX provides an event-based 
framework for parsing XML data, which is the process of reading through the document and 
breaking down the data into usable parts. SAX defines all the possible events that could happen 
during the parsing procedure. For example, SAX defines an org.xml.sax.ContentHandler interface 
that defines startDocument(), startE/ement(. . .), error(. .. ) and warning( ... ). Implementing this 
interface allows complete control over these portions of the XML parsing process. A set of errors 
and warnings is defined, allowing handling of unexpected situations that occur during parsing, 
such as invalid or not well-formed document. DOM provides a representation of an XML 
document as a tree. Traversal and manipulation of tree structures are easy to accomplish in 
programming languages. DOM reads an entire XML document into memory, stores all the data in 
nodes, so the entire document is very fast to access. 
SAX and DOM are both programming language independent. The significant drawback of 
DOM is that it consumes a lot of resources. Because DOM reads an entire document into memory, 
application could be slowed down or even crashed. The larger and more complex the document, 
the more pronounced this performance degradation becomes. 
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JAXP is Sun's Java API for XML Parsing. JAXP does not compete with or replace either of 
SAX and DOM, it does add some convenience methods to try to make the XML APis easier to use 
for Java developers. It conforms to the SAX and DOM specifications. It does not redefine SAX or 
DOM behaviour, but ensures that all XML-conformant parsers can be accessed within Java 
application through a standard pluggable layer. 
These above APis should be distinguished from XML parser. Actually, they provide 
framework for parsers to use. A parser must be supplied to SAX and DOM to perform any XML 
parsing. There are many excellent parsers available in Java, such as Apache Xerces, Oracle's XML 
Parser and IBM's XML4J. 
JDOM is designed to the 80/20 rule of usability, i.e., for the 80% of the time we use 20% of 
the functions. It attempts to solve the deficiencies widely recognized in SAX, DOM, and JAXP. It 
seeks to provide a Java-centric, high-performance alternative in most cases. It is not based on 
DOM or SAX, but rather allows a user to deal with an XML document in tree form without the 
idiosyncrasies of DOM. At the same time, it provides the high performance of SAX, allowing very 
quick parsing and output. Additionally, it is namespace-aware; it supports validation through 
DTDs and XML Schema. 
Considering the nature of our implementation, the compliance checker needs to traverse the 
XML document to find a match entry, but does not need to create, modify, insert or append 
anything into the existing document; the structure of the credential and policy is already known, 
the decision should be made as quick as possible. DOM is not adequate for the job and SAX is too 
complicated to deal with some of the common operations such as retrieving a specific element text 
according to a given XPath. We do not have cross-language concerns and Java itself is platform 
independent, JDOM is the ideal choice for the compliance checker. Actually, we have saved more 
than 60% programming time after adopting JDOM. 
4.2 Prototype Interfaces 
Three major interfaces have been defined for the compliance checker and they all start with a 
capital /. They are !ComplianceChecker, !Certificate and !Policy. These interfaces construct the 
foundation of the compliance checker and delineate the basic methods. Different software vendors 
could provide different implementation of the compliance checker. Application developers would 
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not have to worry about the compatibility issues as long as the implementations comply with the 
same specification. Developers can replace the underlying implementation without affecting 
super-stratum applications. Figure 4-1 is the UML graphs for the classes. From now on, interface, 
class, method definitions and variable declarations are utterly described in UMLand our programs 
are written in Java. 
<< intertace >> 
tcertifieate 
+getlssuersQ:Collection 
+getChallengeTel<t() Strill9 
+challengeResponse(response: String,random: String): boo! ean 
+getl np utStreamO I nputStream 
Figure 4-1 the interfaces of the compliance checker 
<< intertace >> 
ICorqDanceChecker 
+check (cert:ICerli1icme,!Wlicy.IPoticy): boolean 
+check(certs:ICerli1ica1e[),!WlicyJPolicy)boolean 
<< intert3ce >> 
!Policy 
+getlnpulstreamO lnputStream 
The interface !Certificate defines the basic methods of a certificate. The method 
getlssuersQ:Collection returns the issuer(s) of the certificate in a Collection. The method 
getChallengeTextQ:String returns a randomly generated text to test the ownership of the alleged 
certificate holder. The method challengeResponse(random:String, response:String):boo/ean tests 
whether the challenge has been successfully digitally signed by the private key of the certificate. 
The method getlnputStreamO:InputStream returns the source of the certificate. 
The interface !Policy defmes the methods of the local trust policy. Unlike certificate, the local 
trust policy is stored in a secure place and does not have to be signed. It has only one method 
getlnputStreamQ:InputStream which returns the XML source of the policy. 
The interface !ComplianceChecker defines the methods of the compliance checker. It has two 
methods. The method check(cert:!Certificate, policy:!Policy):boo/ean takes in two parameters, 
cert is a certificate, policy is the local trust policy. It checks whether the certificate complies with 
the trust policy, if so, it returns true, otherwise returns false. It throws an exception 
CheckerException upon error, for example, the format error of the certificate or policy. The 
method check(certs:!Certificate[}, policy:!Policy):boolean takes in two parameters, certs is 
collection of certificates, policy is the local trust policy. The method checks whether the set of 
certificates comply with the local trust policy. If so, it returns true, otherwise false. Furthermore, 
this method tries to find a trust train between the first certificate and the policy rules through the 
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rest of the certificates. It throws an exception Checker Exception upon error. 
4.3 ~mpiementation 
<< intertace ,.,. 
~Certificate 
+getlssuersQ:Collection 
+getChallengeTe»O string 
+challengeR esponse(response: string,rsndom :stri ng):boolean 
+getl np utstreamO lnputStream 
Celtificate 
+C et1ifi cate{ cert: String):vo:d 
+Cet1ificate(file:F~e):void 
+Cettlficate(uri:URL):void 
+C et1i1i cate(is:lnpuiStream ):YOO:I 
+getl ssue rsQ:Collection 
+getChallengeTe»O void 
+chall engeResponse(response: string,random: string): boolean 
+getl np utstream(} lnputStream 
-validate() boolean 
<< inteffa ce ,.,. 
ICo~ecker 
+check(cett:ICertilicate~tcy:IPolicy):boolean 
+check(cetts:ICertilicaleD~tcy:IPoftey}boolean 
<< rea!i:re >> ~ 
. 
+check(cert:ICertilicaleJl:()licy.IPoficy):boolean 
+check (certs:IC ertilicaleD~icy:IPoficy) boo! ean 
<< interface >> 
!Policy 
+getlnputStreamO lnputStream 
~ <<realize,.,. 
Poficy 
+Polic"l'(file:F~e)void 
+Polic\'(file:String) void 
+Poli~urtURL):void 
+Polic"l'(is:lnpulStream):void 
+getl nputStreamO lnputStream 
Figure 4-2 the Java implementation of the compliance checker 
Figure 4-2 is the UML diagram of our implementation of the compliance checker. Class 
Certificate is the implementation of !Certificate. Despite the four methods defined by the super 
interface, it has defined three more methods. Certificate(cert:String) is a constructor method. It 
takes in one parameter cert, which is the file name of the certificate. It throws CertException in 
case of file format or open error. The method validateO: boolean tests the validity of the certificate, 
including signature, time validity and revocation test. It returns true if the validation process 
passes otherwise false. Class Policy is the implementation of !Policy. Class ComplianceChecker is 
the implementation of IComplianceChecker. 
7 
Chapter 4 The Compliance Checker 
Trustfactory 
+getCom pfianceChedrei{):IComplianceChecker 
+getP olicy(fileName:StrirtiD:IPoficy 
+getCerti1icate(111eName:String)1Certi1icate 
+getP oli cy(stream :lnpu!Stream) void 
+getCer1i1icate(stream:lnputStream):void 
Figure 4-3 the instance factory 
Class TrustFactory is the instance factory. It automatically selects the best version of the 
implementation, generates and returns the instances of the interfaces. It has the following methods: 
getCertificate(cert:String):ICertificate and getCertificate(cert:InputStream):ICertificate 
are the factories of the interface of !Certificate. They take in different parameters and return an 
instance of !Certificate. 
getPolicy(policy: String) :!Policy and getPolicy(policy:lnputStream): !Policy 
are the factories of the interface !Policy. They take in different parameters and return an instance 
of the interface !Policy. 
The method getComplianceCheckerQ:IComplianceChecker returns an instance of the interface 
IComplianceChecker. 
The compliance checking procedure is shown in Figure 4-4. 
1. First of all, it checks the validity of the local trust policy. If this step fails, possibly caused 
by ill-formed XML format or unrecognised policy version, the checking procedure fails 
and an Exception will be thrown. 
2. An Exception will be thrown if there is no certificate. 
3. Because there could be more than one certificate, the checker inspects them one by one in 
a loop. 
4. Get the next certificate in the queue and validate it. The validation process includes 
certificate format version checking, algorithm checking, validity period checking, 
signature validation, and revocation validation. If succeeds, proceed to the next step, 
otherwise go to step 8. 
5. Locate the certificate issuer in the trust policy by matching its public key. If the certificate 
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issuer can be found, then go to step 7, otherwise proceed to the next step. 
6. Find a position in the trust forest and the trust policy. 
7. If the certificate content complies with the trust policy, then add it to the trust forest, 
otherwise proceed to the next step. 
8. If there are more certificates in the queue to be processed, go to step 4, otherwise proceed 
to the next step. 
9. Now all the certificates have been processed and we have a constructed trust forest. If the 
trust forest is empty, i.e., none of the certificates is trusted, then it fails, otherwise proceed 
to the next step. 
10. Find rooted leaves in the trust forest. If there are no rooted leaves, then it fails, otherwise 
proceed to the next step. 
11. If the request complies with the leaves, then it succeeds, otherwise it fails. 
9 
Chapter 4 The Compliance Checker 
nel<! certllcste 
1«:01~ a po.snlon' 
(1111rilnnc 1 
<X>mPDI~ 
llltribl.lle certi t cnle 
Wthpolicy 
] falls] 
lai!Oe 
• start 
at li!ast one certl•c:are7 
l ocst~ ras~r 
inpolir;y by 
match int;~ public l:ev 
ce rtltcale type 
more c:ertiflcme? 
K' 
ltu.- lorl>tllsempl'(? ono) 
is there rootc<llci!Ve$? 
o~$) 
does lhe re<J,Jest 
romply Wth 
tocJ.i!dlea~? 
i 
1rue 
(deleg81i on] 
compn< c 
<lclegnli0f1 oortitcme 
v.ilh polir;y 
()'CS] 
Figure 4-4 the activity diagram of the compliance checking procedure 
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Figure 4-5 how the application invokes the compliance checker 
Figure 4-5 shows how an application invokes the compliance checker 
1. There must be at least one certificate otherwise an error occurs. 
2. Validating the policy. This optional step could be done at the application level or 
compliance checker level. 
3. Get next certificate in the queue. 
4. Validate the certificate. This step includes XML validation, schema compliance checking 
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and certificate validity verification. 
5. If it needs to ensure the alleged holder of the certificate, then challenge the holder with a 
randomly generated text. Otherwise go to step 7. 
6. If the challenge succeeds, then add it the valid certificate list, otherwise the whole process 
fails. 
7. If there are more certificates in the queue, then go to step 3, otherwise proceed to the next 
step. 
8. If the valid certificate list is not empty, then call the compliance checker usmg the 
certificate list and policy as parameters, Otherwise it fails. 
4.4 Shared libraries 
The implementation has been wrapped into a web service and a .jar file. It can be integrated 
into any applications as an access control component. 
4.4.1 Jar library 
B ~'B mojoy .jar 
. B· ~ mojoy .jar 
i±J ~ MET A-INF 
i±J {QJ org 
8 ~ Uk 
8~ ac 
8~ dur 
8~ cs 
B~ mojoy 
[tJ ~ commandline 
i±J ~ wlndowgui 
. ·9.> CertException .class 
-•> Certificate.class 
.. J~j. ComplianceChecker .class 
· -~1- ComplianceCheckingException .class 
-~> ErrHandler .class 
~~- !Certificate .class 
·· •;. IComplianceChecker .class 
-•> lnfo.class 
~;. !Policy .class 
-~1- Policy .class 
· ~;. PolicyException .class 
•;. Resutt .class 
~;. TrustFactory .class 
··· --~1> Xm!Tool.class 
Figure 4-6 the .jar file of the implementation 
Application developers can easily import the classes into the application and use the 
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interfaces and implementations. Figure 4-7 shows a simple example. It constructs an !Certificate 
object, an !Policy object and an IComplianceChecker object. It invokes the check method and gets 
a boolean result. 
import uk.ac.dur.cs.mojoy. *; 
public class CommandLine { 
} 
public static void main( String[] args) { 
try{ 
!Certificate cert=TrustFactory.getCertificate("certificate.xml"); 
!Policy policy=TrustFactory.getPolicy("policy.xml"); 
IComplianceChecker checker=TrustFactory.getComplianceCheckerO; 
boolean result=checker(cert, policy); 
} catch(Exception e){ 
System. out. println( e.printStackTraceO ); 
} 
Figure 4-7 an example of the usage of the compliance checker .jar library 
4..4.2 Web services 
The library has also been wrapped into web services using Axis, which is the successor of 
Apache SOAP. Our test environment of the web service is Microsoft Windows XP Professional 
Edition, Sun Java JDK 1.4.1. The web service server is Tomcat 4.0.6. 
Deploying the web service is quite simple. Copy mojoy.war under the directory 
$tomcat!webapps, launch Tomcat, Tomcat will automatically uncompress and deploy. The URL of 
the deployment is http://localhost:8080/mojoylservicesl, type the URL into the address bar of the 
browser and hit return, the deployment infommtion will appear in the browser window (Figure 
4-8). These messages mean that the web services had been successfully deployed and are ready to 
be invoked. 
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Figure 4-8 deployment of the compliance checker as web services 
ComplianceCheckerSoapBindingStub binding= (ComplianceCheckerSoapBindingStub) new 
ComplianceCheckerServiceLocatorQ.getComplianceCheckerQ; 
boolean value= binding.check(certi:ficate, policy); 
Figure 4-9 web service client side sample 
Figure 4-9 shows a basic sample of the invoking of the compliance checker deployed as a 
web service. Compared with the .jar library, the advantages of web service are obvious: 
• There is no factory class needed to manufacture the implementation. 
• Server side can upgrade the web service implementation whenever they want without 
notifying client side. 
• The client side application could be developed in any language under any platform other 
than Java. 
4.5 Demo 
The purpose of the demo is to demonstrate the work process of the compliance checker. The 
demo itself is a calling application, the compliance checker acts as the access control component. 
The application (demo) accepts outside user request and passes it, together with some supporting 
documents, to the access control component (compliance checker). The access control component 
examines the relevant documents and returns an access control decision. The application shows 
Chapter 4 The Compliance Checker 
the final decision to the user. The input includes user request, user certificate, local trust policy and 
environmental parameters. The access control decisions are permit, deny or cannot determine. 
File ConfiQ Checker Lang~ Help 
~ 115 ~· 
Policy' I C:\Documents ~nd Settings\Chenxi\My Doc J Choose Ed~ 
Certificate' [~D-o-.;u-.;:;e~!; and Settings\ChenKi\My Doc J Choose I [ Ed~ 
Target' [ ta;Qet- - ---_-_ ] 
Action' read c,eJ.:..-t 
Authority Attributes' [~: \D~uments and Settings\Chenxi\My Doc• ] Choose I I Edit 
Option [ C:\~oc~ents and Settin9s\C~Ki\My ~cj Choose I [ Edit 
Envionment I C:\Documents and Settings\Chenxi\i-'ly Doc• ] Choose I [ Edit 
Log J C: \D~.;uments and Settings\Che,;;iWy Doc] Choose 
Compliance Checker Run 
Message 
View Log 
Status 
Figure 4-10 the Java demo of the compliance checker 
The demo of the compliance checker is written in Java Swing. The application has been 
wrapped in one JAR fi le, mojoywindow.jar. The test environment is Microsoft Windows XP 
Professional Edition, Sun Java SDK 1.4.1, Apache Xerces XML parser. The compliance checker's 
version is 0. 1. Double click the file mojoywindowjar or type Java -jar mojoywindowjar at the 
command line prompt will launch the application (Figure 4-10). 
Please follow the instructions to invoke the checking process. 
1. Choose the policy fi le. Policy is the locally trusted security policy. Users can type the full 
path and file name into the box, or use the Choose button to open a file chooser dialog and 
select a file. Currently, the compliance checker only supports single policy file, later 
versions will support multiple policies. The default policy is policy.xml under the present 
directory. The Edit button allows the users to view and edit the file content (Figure 4-11 ). 
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2. Choose the certificate file. Certificate is the user's evidence to support his request. 
Currently, the compliance checker only supports one certificate. It is expected that later 
versions will support multiple certificates. The default certificate is cert.xml. 
3. Choose the request. The request consists of a target and an action. The target is the object 
that the user wants to access. The action is what the user wants to perform on the object. 
4. Choose authority attribute file. The authority attribute file contains the attributes of the 
certificate issuers. They are retrieved from other relevant certificates and stored in the file. 
The process of how they are retrieved is omitted here. The default file for is auattr.xml. 
5. Choose option file. The option file specifies the settings of the compliance checker. It 
specifies the logging level, whether to perform format validity check, the version of the 
XML parser, etc. The compliance checker will use default settings without the option file 
being specified. The default file is option.txt. This setting is optional. 
6. Choose environmental setting file. The environmental setting file contains environmental 
settings, such as time and IP address. These environmental parameters are collected by the 
application and stored in the file. The default file is env.txt. This setting is optional. 
7. Choose log file. The log file records the debug, warning and/or error messages generated 
during the process of compliance checking. It helps the administrator to determine the 
problems during compliance checking. If it is left empty, then no message will be logged. 
The default file is log. txt. This setting is optional. 
8. Start compliance checker. Click the Run button to start the compliance checker. 
9. The message box will show the process and the result of the compliance checking: penn it, 
deny or cannot determine. The log file contains the comprehensive information of the 
error messages, for instance, which part of the certificate/policy does not comply with the 
schema, or what target/action is not recognized. Users can view the log file by clicking the 
View Log button. 
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<?xml versioo••1 _a• encoding•"UTF -8"?> 
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Figure 4-11 editor dialog window 
<!-- administrator of IBM -> 
<As suer> 
<Publcl<ey> 
•Keylnfo> 
<.4<eylnfo> 
<ll'ublicKey> 
<T arget>IBMJResources<fT arget> 
<KeyValue>llM's publtc key<DSAKeyValue/> 
<A<eyValue> 
The editor dialog window is opened by the demo. In the editor window, user can open, view, 
edit and save file . 
4.6 Performance and security issues 
There have always been performance concerns about PKI. Our architecture is not an 
exception since the certificate is protected by digital signature based on PKI. Theoretically, there 
are two bottlenecks during the process of compliance checking. The first one is certificate 
validation, including certificate digital signature verification and revocation check. Digital 
signature verification includes a series of XML canonical computing, message digest computing, 
and public key encryption. And these complex algorithms usually take up a lot of computing 
resources, the execution time is proportional to the size of the certificate. Because the certificate is 
usually very small compared to the size of policy, the execution time could be regarded as a static 
and small value. Certificate revocation check includes referring back to the issuing authority and 
checking whether it has been explicitly revoked before the validity date. The second bottleneck is 
the compliance checking process. Because it involves a double loop, the execution time is linearly 
proportional to the size of certificate and policy. As a solution to alleviate the burden of 
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revalidating and processing these certificates, a certificate repository could be established to store 
the valid certificates for a short period, for example, six hours. Within this period, certificate 
would not have to be revalidated and hence expedite the performance of the whole system. 
XML parsing is not a problem at all. According to our test, validating a 3MB XML file only 
takes up 2-3 seconds. Our test environment is Pentium 4 2.8GHz, 512MB memory, 40GB hard 
drive, Windows XP Professional Edition, Sun Java JDK 1.4, and Apache Xerces XML Java parser. 
4. 7 Implementation limitations 
Our implementation has several limitations due to limited time. For instance, the function of 
certificate validation is not included. The XML parser is able to check XML validity, the 
certificate and policy tested in our experiments are assumed to be valid by itself. Actually there are 
several off the peg software packages available to carry out the task. For instance, Apache XML 
security library provides both Java and C++ implementations that comply with the W3C standards 
[21][22]. Also, the function of challenging the holder is not implemented. Implementing the 
function of challenge should be careful of replay attack, in which the attacker intercepts the 
response sent back by the authentic holder and resends it to the server to impersonate the holder. 
To prevent such attacks, server should append a nonce to the challenging message. Replies with an 
obsolete nonce should be discarded. Implementing the construction of trust forest from loads of 
certificates and finding out a trust train from the constructed trust forest is huge work. It involves 
privilege delegation and empowerment, interpretation of various certificates and enforcement of 
local trust policy. Our implemented is able to deal with one certificate and one policy. The 
algorithm of dealing with two or more certificates is very complicated and is left to future work. 
4.8 Summary 
The task of the compliance checker is to take in the user request, user's certificate, the policy 
and environmental parameters and produce an access control decision. We have developed a Java 
implementation of the compliance checker in this chapter. A demo based on Java Swing is also 
developed to demonstrate how the compliance checker works. The checker is designed to be 
flexible to be incorporated into any applications. 
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5.1 Resource Sharing Union 
Durham.org and newcastle.org are two organizations. They provide resources for their 
registered users. Both organizations have their own security regulations to protect their online 
resources. Only registered users are allowed to access the resources. The resources are divided into 
three categories: public, private and premium. Public resources are available to everybody 
(including non-registered users). These resources include weather forecast, Internet search and 
web storage, etc. Private resources are for registered users only. Premium resources are restricted 
to premium users. Premium resources will charge a fee according to usage. These resources 
include financial information real time report, advanced Internet search, tourist discount, etc. 
The present situation is that every registered user has a unique account and a password to log 
onto the system. To protect their resources, the two organizations have adopted different Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) mechanisms. In durham.org, four kinds of roles have been defined. 
They are guests, members, premium members and administrators (Table 5-l). Guests are those 
non-registered users whose actions are restricted to "read public information". Members are those 
registered users who have access to the free resources. Premium members are upgraded from 
members. They subscribe value-added services and pay an annual fee to enjoy them. 
Administrators perform supervision tasks. They set up local security policies, issue certificates to 
registered members, etc. In newcastle.org, five kinds of roles have been defined. They are guests, 
users, power users, staffs and managers (Table 5-2). Guests are those non-registered users whose 
actions are restricted to browse public information. Users are those registered users who have 
access to the free resources. Power users are upgraded from users; they subscribe value-added 
services and pay an ammal fee to enjoy them. StaffS have a special privilege to access "staff-only" 
information. Managers perform system routine tasks. They set up local security policies, issue 
certificates to registered members, etc. 
Chapter 5 Application Case Study 
Table 5-1 durham.org's RBAC system 
ROLES PERMISSIONS 
Guests Browse public information 
Members Access to internal information 
Premium members Access to pay services 
Administrators System supervision 
Table 5-2 newcastle.org's RBAC system 
ROLES PERMISSIONS 
Guests Browse public information 
Users Access to internal information 
Power users Access to advanced information 
Staff Access to staff-only information 
Managers System supervision 
Both durham.org and newcastle.org have advantages and disadvantages of resources they 
offer. For example, durham.org provides tourist discount information but newcastle.org does not, 
while newcastle.org provides latest financial real time report but durham.org does not. Developing 
these services independently is time consuming and financially unacceptable. The best solution 
would be sharing resources with each other. The members of durham.org will be able to access the 
online resources of the newcastle.org and vice versa. 
The requirements of the new architecture are: 
• The original security architecture of the organizations should be preserved so that those 
previous registered users' privileges remain intact. 
• The users of either side could access peer's resources without an additional registration. 
• The new architecture should have the ability to incorporate more potential organizations 
into the system without change to the existing architecture. The joining/leaving of the 
individual organization does not affect the whole system. 
• All the resources of the two organizations should be unifonnly presented to the users as if 
they are in the san1e location. 
• The organizations are independent of each other; each maintains its own policy. 
Chapter 5 Application Case Study 
5.2 Incompetence of the previous access control models 
Figure 5-1 incompatible RBAC prohibits the unification 
RBAC, the current access control model of both systems, does not satisfy the new 
requirements of the upgrade. The drawback is that the account is only recognized locally and is 
not effective outside of the scope of the organization. At the first glance, those two online 
organizations resemble each other a bit, but a further careful study reveals their inner 
incompatibilities. For example, Alice is a registered user of durham.org, her account is alice. She 
is a premium member, i.e. the account alice has been assigned the role premium members, or 
alice<-premium members. Everything is fine if she stays within durham.org, but when she goes to 
newcastle.org, the account alice is not recognized, thus all her request will be rejected. Merging all 
the accounts of the two organizations is not acceptable because it takes too much time and effort 
and there could be account name conflict. Appending domain name to the tail could be a solution, 
for instance alice@durham, but incompatible RBAC systems thwart it. The access control system 
of newcastle.org will find that the role premium members assigned to alice@durham is not 
recognized, therefore all her requests will be denied. Even if the names of the roles are identical, 
for instance, both organizations have defined the role guests, the privileges assigned to the roles 
could be radically different. Furthermore, unboundedly importing accounts and roles into the 
current system from newly joined organizations could be an undue burden. Therefore we can draw 
the conclusion that simply merging the two or more RBACs is completely impractical under the 
distributed computing environment. We must find a new solution. 
5.3 Our solution 
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Figure 5-2 our solution for the Resource Sharing Union 
A Resource Sharing Centre (RSC) will be set up to help the communication between the 
organizations (Figure 5-2). The organizations publish resources to the RSC. Users look for 
published information on the RSC. Five basic actions can be performed on the RSC. They are list, 
search, info, subscribe and get. List returns all the available resources. Search returns resources by 
keywords. Info returns the description of the resource. Get redirects the user to the reallocation of 
the resource. 
RSC allows requests from registered users of the allied organizations. Users must produce an 
attribute certificate to prove that he/she is a member of the allied organization. RSC validates the 
certificate. Validation process divides into the following steps. First of all, the system checks the 
certificate format is recognized and strictly follows one of the standards. The second step ensures 
that the certificate is within its validity period by comparing the valid after time, valid before time 
and current time of the system. The third step computes the canonicalized value of the certificate, 
the message digest value, the signature with the public key contained in the certificate and 
compares it with the original signature. The fourth step checks whether the certificate has been 
revoked. If all of the four steps pass, then the certificate is regarded as valid. Then the server 
challenges the certificate holder to verify that he is the owner of the corresponding private key, 
usually by sending a message encrypted by the public key contained in the certificate, the message 
is comprised of a random sequence plus nonce. If the alleged holder could successfully decrypt 
and send back the original infonnation, then the server is convinced that the holder is authentic. 
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Next the RSC examines whether the certificate issuer is trusted. It scans its local trust policy 
to find a root of trust (see chapter 2.1 ), usually by matching public key. If the certificate is within 
legitimate scope, then the certificate is trusted. If a direct trust relationship cannot be established, 
the server will try to find a chain of certificates that could be finally traced back to a root of trust. 
The certificate is trusted either through a direct trust or a trust chain. 
The user begins to find resources on the RSC after trust has been established. The RSC is 
only a directory which lists all the resources and will redirect the user to the real location upon 
request. RSC acts as a trusted third party between the users and the organizations. For instance, it 
could certify the credibility of the users by double signing the user's certificate, or issues 
certificate directly to the user, or issues certificate to the user's belonged organization. The former 
two create a direct trust while the last one produces a trust chain. 
Upon receiving request from the user, the service provider first validates the certificate. Then 
maps the user to the local RBAC system according to SLA, or makes access decision directly from 
the user's capability certificate. Finally, the user accesses the resources. 
The advantages of our new architecture are: 
e The allied organizations do not have to change the original access control model, they can 
preserve the old security structure, thus to the most extent avoid the disorder caused by 
the introduction of the new system. 
o Members do not have to register with every organization. They get certificate from the 
organization they belonged to. Their authenticity is guaranteed by the certificate issuer as 
long as the issuer is trusted by the other organizations. 
e The organizations are independent of each other. Each one has its own trust policy that 
defines the credibility and trust level of the other organizations. 
e Organizations do not have to know each other in advance. The precondition is that all 
allied organizations must at least trust one RSC. RSC guarantees the credibility of all the 
allied organizations by issuing certificate to them. 
e Newly joined organizations could easily be incorporated into the circle. All they have to 
do is getting a certificate from the RSC. RSC issues delegation certificate to the new 
organization. All the allied members trust the RSC and thus accept the newly joined 
organization. 
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5.4 Assumptions 
It is necessary for us to make some assumptions of the designed architecture. 
e The RSC is trusted by all the allied organizations in the architecture. All the certificates 
issued by RSC are trusted by the organizations. 
e The syntax and semantics of the certificates and the policy are understood by all the allied 
organizations and RSC. There would be no misunderstandings and/or misinterpretations. 
• The certificate and policy are written in well-formed XML. They are semantically healthy 
and will not cause confusions. 
e All the registered users of the organizations have the required certificates to identify 
themselves. 
• Organizations and RSC are willing to issue certificates to the users upon request. It is also 
the individual organization's responsibility to protect their users' privacy. 
• Users can store their private keys securely and prove the ownership upon challenge. 
• The server protects its local trust policy from being tampered. 
e The server will automatically collect missing certificates. 
e The privacy protection of the certificate and policy will not be discussed. We assume that 
all the certificates in the application case study are disclosed on a basis of willingness and 
do not involve any privacy issues. 
Chapter 6 Scenarios and Experiments 
Alice is a registered member of durham.org. She has an account alice and has been assigned 
the role member. She can search for information in durham.org. Now she wants to find 
infom1ation about computer virus in newcastle.org. First of all, she needs to get a certificate from 
durham.org that certifies her present situation in durham.org (Figure 6-1 ). The certificate says that 
Alice is a registered member of durham.org. Her position is member. The validity period of the 
certificate is from 01/0112004 to 01/01/2010. Alice's authenticity is proved by her public key. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--Alice's attribute certificate issued by durham.org --> 
<Certificate xmlns="http://www.dur.ac. uklchenxi.huang/mojoy0.1 "> 
<Attributes> 
<Attribute> 
<Name>organization</N arne> 
<Value>durham.org<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
<Attribute> 
<Name>position</Name> 
<Value>member<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
</Attributes> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>OO:OO:OO 01/0 1/2004</StartTime> 
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<EndTime>OO:OO:OO 01/01/201 0</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> Alice's public key</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey>durham.org's public key</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-1 Alice's attribute certificate issued by durham.org 
For the second step, she submits her certificate to the Resource Sharing Centre. RSC 
validates the certificate; it verifies the certificate's well-formedness, signature, validity and the 
authenticity of the holder. RSC recognizes durham.org because it is an allied organization of the 
Resource Sharing Union. Then RSC looks up its local trust policy (Figure 6-2). The policy says 
that durham.org is a trusted organization; the attribute certificate issued by durham.org is trusted. 
RSC locates the entry of durham.org by matching the public key and finds out Alice's attribute 
certificate is within the legitimate scope. Then RSC grants Alice the privileges according the local 
attribute-permission mapping policy. In this case, Alice will be granted the ability to search for 
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information within the Union. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- RSC's local security policy--> 
<Policy xmlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Rules> 
<Rule> 
<!--durham.org & newcastle.org can issue attribute & capability certificate--> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
durham.org's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
newcastle.org's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Privileges> 
<Privilege> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>rsc/searchservice</Target> 
</Targets> 
Chapter 6 Scenarios and Experiments 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
<Action>execute</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
<Attributes> 
<Any Attribute/> 
</Attributes> 
</Privilege> 
</Privileges> 
</Rule> 
</Rules> 
</Policy> 
Figure 6-2 RSC's local trust policy 
For the third step, Alice enters the keyword computer virus into the search engine and gets a 
list of results. She is interested in two results, one is an ordinary news report and the other is a pay 
service, both of which are located on a remote server of newcastle.org. RSC redirects her to 
newcastle.org. When Alice arrives at newcastle.org, she produces her attribute certificate (Figure 
6-1) to the access control system of newcastle.org. The access control system validates the 
certificate and then looks up its local trust policy (Figure 6-3). The policy says that durham.org is 
a trusted organization; the attribute certificate issued by durham.org is trusted. The access control 
system locates the entry of durham.org by matching the public key. It finds out that Alice's 
attribute certificate issued by durham.org is trusted. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- newcastle.org's local security policy--> 
<Policy xrnlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Rules> 
<Rule> 
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<!-- durham.org issues attribute certificate--> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
durham.org's public key 
</Public Key> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Privileges> 
<Attributes> 
<Attribute> 
<Any Attribute/> 
</Attribute> 
<I Attributes> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/private/a</Target> 
<Target>newcastle.org/private/b</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
<Action>execute</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
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</Privileges> 
</Rule> 
</Rules> 
</Policy> 
Figure 6-3 newcastle.org's local trust policy 
Then Alice's position will be mapped to the local RBAC system according to SLA (the 
design of SLA is beyond the topic of this thesis). In this case, Alice will be assigned the role users 
in the local system. Then access control will be handed over to local RBAC system to carry on. 
The role of users has been assigned the permissions to access the computer virus infom1ation, 
Alice will be granted access right to the information. 
RBAC by itself does not provide fine-grained access control. The server needs extra 
information of the requester in order to finely control the resources. For instance, the resources are 
pay services. These services are restricted to the premium members of newcastle.org and they 
must pay to enjoy the services. Alice is also required to pay before she could use the service. She 
could pay either at durham.org or RSC, and in return she gets a certificate (Figure 6-4). The 
certificate says that Alice is the holder. She is able to read the resources identified by the URI 
newcastle.orglprivatela. Durham.org is the issuer. The validity period of the certificate is from 
01/01/2004 to 01101/2005. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--Alice's capability certificate--> 
<Certificate xmlns="http:/ /www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/private/a</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
</Actions> 
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</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>OO:OO:OO 01/01/2004</StartTime> 
<EndTime>OO:OO:OO 01/0 112005</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
Alice's public key 
</Public Key> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
durham.org's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
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</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-4 Alice's capability certificate that confines her to the specific service 
Alice submits it to newcatle.org. The access control system validates the certificate and looks 
into its local trust policy (Figure 6-3). The policy says that durham.org is a trusted authority, it is 
able to issue certificates to its users but the targets should be confined to newcastle.orglprivate/a 
and newcastle.orglprivatelb, the actions should be confined to read and execute. The access 
control system verifies that the public key of the certificate issuer is durham.org and the 
capabilities contained in the certificate are within the confined scope. Alice's request is to read the 
resource newcastle.org/privatela. The request is allowed by the certificate and the policy, therefore 
the access will be allowed. She finally gains access to the computer virus information. 
6.2 Scenario 2 (environmental factors) 
Sometimes the service providers require placing environmental constraints. These constraints 
are independent of the users and cannot be represented through RBAC. Environmental constraints 
include time and location constraints. An example is that newcastle.org wants to restrict the access 
from the users of durham.org within the period from Monday to Friday, 9 am to 2 pm, and the 
request must be initiated from a recognized IP address. The policy is defined in Figure 6-5. The 
policy says that durham.org is a trusted issuer and it is able to issue certificates. The valid 
capabilities include read permission to newcastle.org/public and read, execute permissions to 
newcastle.orglpremium. Any attributes are permitted. The certificates are restricted by the 
constraints. The constraints include date, time and IP address. The permitted time period is from 9 
am to 5 pm, specified by the local time of newcastle.org. The request must be initiated from the IP 
address segment 129.234.155.0/24, which denotes the IP address segment is 129.234.155.0 and 
the subnet mask is 255.255.255.0. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- Newcastle.org's local trust policy with environmental constraints--> 
<Policy xmlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Rules> 
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<Rule> 
<Conditions> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
durham.org's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<IPConstraint> 
129.234.155.0/24 
</IPConstraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>09:00:00</StartTime> 
<EndTime> 17:00:00</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Conditions> 
<Privileges> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/public</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
</Actions> 
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</Capability> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/premium<ffarget> 
<ffargets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
<Action>execute</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
<Attributes> 
<Any Attribute/> 
</Attributes> 
</Privileges> 
</Rule> 
</Rules> 
</Policy> 
Figure 6-5 newcastle.org's local trust policy with environmental constraints 
These constraints could also be expressed in the certificate by the issuer (Figure 6-6). The 
certificate is issued by durham.org, it says that Alice is able to read the resource 
newcastle.orglpublic, but her access is restricted within the period from 9 am to 5 pm, and the 
access must be initiated from a computer with a recognized IP address within the segment 
129.234.155.0/24. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--Alice's certificate with constraints --> 
<Certificate xmlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
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<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/public</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>09:00:00</StartTime> 
<EndTime> 17:00:00</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
<IPConstraint> 
129.234.155.0/24 
</IPConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
Alice's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
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<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
durham.org's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-6 Alice's certificate that contains environmental constraints 
Another organization leeds.org wants to join the Resource Sharing Union, so that all the three 
organizations could share their resources together. Leeds.org has its own RBAC access control 
system that is incompatible with the others'. Four types of roles have been defmed: visitors, 
students, staff and root. Visitors are those outsiders who do not have registered accounts with 
leeds.org; they can only browse public information. Students are those who have registered and 
have been assigned an account and a password to log onto the system; they can access to both 
public and internal information. Staff users have been assigned a special privilege to the staff only 
section. Root users are the system security administrators; they perform system maintenance tasks, 
such as making policies, manage user accounts, etc. 
Table 6-1 the RBAC system ofleeds.org 
ROJLJES PERSMRSSIONS 
Students Access to public and private information 
Visitors Browse public information 
Staff Access to information that is only available to staff 
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I Root I Manages the security issues 
Bob is a registered member of leeds.org. He has an attribute certificate from leeds.org (Figure 
6-7). If he goes to newcastle.org and wants to access the resources, he will be rejected because the 
issuer of the certificate, leeds.org, is a stranger to newcastle.org. The certificate issued by leeds.org 
will not be trusted by newcastle.org. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--Bob's attribute certificate issued by leeds.org --> 
<Certificate xmlns="http:/ /www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoy0.1 "> 
<Attributes> 
<Attribute> 
<Name>organization</Name> 
<Value>leeds.org<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
<Attribute> 
<Name>position</Name> 
<Value>member<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
</Attributes> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>O 1/01/2004 00:00:00</StartTime> 
<EndTime>O 1/01/2010 00:00:00</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
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</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
Bob's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
leeds.org's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-7 Bob's attribute certificate issued by leeds.org 
The easiest way to incorporate leeds.org into the union is to get a delegation certificate 
(Figure 6-8) from the RSC because RSC is trusted by all the allied organizations. The certificate 
says that leeds.org is able to issue any attribute and capability to its members. The validity period 
is from 01/01/2004 to 01/01/2010. 
<?xrnl version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--leeds' delegation certificate issued by RSC --> 
<Certificate xmlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Privileges> 
<Privilege> 
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<Attributes> 
<Any Attribute/> 
</Attributes> 
<Capabilities> 
<AnyCapability/> 
</Capabilities> 
</Privilege> 
</Privileges> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>OO:OO:OO 0110 112004</StartTime> 
<EndTime>OO:OO:OO 01101120 10</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
leeds' public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
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RSC's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-8 leeds.org's delegation certificate issued by RSC 
Newcastle.org's trust policy (Figure 6-9) says that RSC is a trusted entity, it is allowed to 
issue certificate to the allied organizations. The privileges that can be delegated include any 
attribute and some specific capabilities. Bob goes to newcastle.org and requests for the resources. 
He produces his attribute certificate (Figure 6-7) and leeds.org's delegation certificate issued by 
RSC (Figure 6-8). The access control system of newcastle.org looks up its local trust policy, finds 
out that the RSC is a trusted entity and the delegation certificate issued by the RSC is trusted. 
Leeds.org is allowed to issue attribute certificate. Therefore a trust chain could be found, which is 
RSC -> leeds.org -> Bob. Newcastle.org establishes trust with leeds.org through RSC and as a 
result Bob's certificate is accepted. Bob will be mapped to a local role according to a series of 
mapping rules. In this case he will be granted the role users (trust is usually established at the 
minimal degree). The rest of the access control procedure will be handed over to local RBAC 
system. Finally Bob gets access to the resource. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!-- newcastle.org's trust policy that allows empowerment--> 
<Policy xrnlns="http;/ /www.dur.ac. uklchenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Rules> 
<Rule> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Issuers> 
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<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
RSC's public key 
</Public Key> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Privilege> 
<Attributes> 
<Attribute> 
<Name> Resource Sharing Union</Name> 
<Value>member<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
</Attributes> 
</Privilege> 
</Rule> 
<Rule> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Attributes> 
<Attribute> 
<Name> Resource Sharing Union</Name> 
<Value>member<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
</Attributes> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
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</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Privilege> 
<Attributes> 
<Any Attribute/> 
</Attributes> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/public</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
</Privilege> 
</Rule> 
</Rules> 
</Policy> 
Figure 6-9 newcastle.org's trust policy that allows empowerment 
Unconstrained delegation of privilege is often dangerous because of the jeopardy of being 
compromised. Hence it should be carefully dealt with. In our model of empowerment, individual 
entity could finely control the scope of delegation by specifying the privileges assigned to the 
delegatee in its local trust policy. For instance, newcastle.org's trust policy (Figure 6-9) says that 
RSC is a trustworthy delegation authority, and it is permitted to delegate read permission to 
newcastle.orglpublic to any subject. 
Bob's capability certificate (Figure 6-10) issued by leeds.org grants him read pem1ission to 
the private information (newcastle.org/private) and public information (newcastle.org/public) of 
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newcastle.org. A trust chain could be found to support him, which is RSC -> leeds.org -> Bob. 
According to the trust policy, the former is out of the valid scope and is not permitted, but the 
latter is allowed. Therefore, Bob's request to read newcastle.org/private will be denied but his 
request to read newcatle.orglpub/ic will be allowed. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--Bob's capability certificate issued by leeds.org --> 
<Certificate xmlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Capabilities> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/private</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
<Capability> 
<Targets> 
<Target>newcastle.org/public</Target> 
</Targets> 
<Actions> 
<Action>read</ Action> 
</Actions> 
</Capability> 
</Capabilities> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
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<StartTime>OO:OO:OO 01/0 1/2004</StartTime> 
<EndTime>OO:OO:OO 01/01/201 0</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
Bob's public key 
</Public Key> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
leeds.org's public key 
</Public Key> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-10 Bob's capability certificate issued by leeds.org 
Leeds.org could be incorporated into the union with the concept we termed as trust 
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empowerment. Leeds.org gets a membership attribute certificate from RSC (Figure 6-11 ), it says 
that leeds.org is an allied organization of the Resource Sharing Union. 
<?xml version="l.O" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!--leeds.org's attribute certificate issued by RSC --> 
<Certificate xmlns="http://www.dur.ac.uk/chenxi.huang/mojoyO.l "> 
<Attributes> 
<Attribute> 
<Name> Resource Sharing Union</Name> 
<Value>member<Nalue> 
</Attribute> 
</Attributes> 
<Conditions> 
<Condition> 
<Constraints> 
<Constraint> 
<TimeConstraint> 
<StartTime>OO:OO:OO 01/01/2004</StartTime> 
<EndTime>OO:OO:OO 01/01/201 0</EndTime> 
</TimeConstraint> 
</Constraint> 
</Constraints> 
</Condition> 
</Conditions> 
<Holders> 
<Subject> 
<PublicKey> 
leeds' public key 
</Public Key> 
</Subject> 
</Holders> 
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<Issuers> 
<Subject> 
<Public Key> 
RSC's public key 
</PublicKey> 
</Subject> 
</Issuers> 
<Signature> 
signature of the certificate 
</Signature> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 6-llleeds.org's attribute certificate issued by the RSC 
Newcastle.org's local trust policy (Figure 6-9) says that RSC is trusted to entitle membership 
to new organizations and the members of the Resource Sharing Union is able to issue certificate to 
their subordinate members, thereby enabling them to visit neighbours' resources in the union. Bob 
goes to newcastle.org and submits his attribute certificate (Figure 6-7). The access control system 
checks his certificate, finds out he is from an unknown organization. Then it gets the membership 
certificate of leeds.org (Figure 6-11 ). The issuer of the membership certificate is the trusted RSC. 
Therefore, the trust chain is found, which is newcastle.org -> RSC -> leeds.org -> Bob. Bob will 
become trusted. 
6.5 Analysis 
We have studied four scenarios in this chapter. The first scenario discusses the possibility of 
preserving and utilising RBAC in a distributed system. RBAC is an effective access control model 
for centrally managed organizations. It successfully converts abstract responsibilities to concrete 
roles, making security management straightforward and easy. However, in a distributed 
environment, different organizations adopt different RBACs, making it difficult for a user to 
transfer from one security domain to another. Certificate based access control sets up a bridge to 
supply the gap between those different RBACs. It supplements rather than replaces RBAC hence 
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RBAC could be preserved in the distributed system. The two organizations, durham.org and 
newcastle.org, cannot incorporate each other directly because of incompatible RBAC systems. 
Certificate based approach supplies the gap. Roles are stored in certificates as attributes. The role 
definitions are interpreted according to SLA. This scenario proves that certificate based approach 
is a very good complement of RBAC. Furthem1ore, capability certificate lets the certificate issuer 
finely control the privileges assigned to each individual. 
The second scenario discusses various constraints. These constraints include time constraints 
and location constraints. Constraints are independent of subjects and are of use when limiting the 
delegated access privileges. Our approach provides a method to fmely control the constraints 
placed on the subjects and the delegated subjects. 
The third scenario discusses the scalability problem. Incorporating a new entity into an 
existing group has always been a challenge. In this scenario, leeds.org is a stranger to durham.org 
and newcastle.org. The certificates issued by leeds.org are not trusted by durham.org and 
newcastle.org. RSC acts as a trusted third party in the process. RSC issues delegation certificate to 
leeds.org, this certificate indirectly proves the credibility of the certificate issued by leeds.org. On 
the other hand, durham.org and leeds.org keep their own trust policies which administer the 
credibility of the RSC and newly joined members. 
The fourth scenario discusses trust empowerment model. Newcastle.org trusts all the 
members of the Resource Sharing Union, but the identities of all the members cannot be known in 
advance. Therefore it trusts based on the attributes of the entities. The membership attributes are 
certified by the RSC. Newcastle.org further trusts the users who are certified by the members of 
the Resource Sharing Union. We term the process as trust empowerment. The process of trust 
empowerment can be totally and fmely managed by the server. 
The access control system uses our compliance checker which is implemented in Java. The 
compliance checker takes in the access request, the users' certificates and the server's policy. It 
applies a double-loop to find out whether the access request is supported by the certificate and 
allowed by the policy. A Boolean result will be returned to allow or deny the access request. 
The achievements of our research could be applied to the healthcare domain. According to 
the Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995 [15], the privacy of personally identifiable health 
information should be protected from unauthorised access. 
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o Health information trustees (defined as health care providers, health care plans, etc) are 
required to allow individual's access to any health information pertaining to the individual 
and to give the opportunity to correct such information. The trustees are also required to 
develop safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the personally identifiable health 
information they maintain. 
o Trustees are required to obtain an individual's authorisation to disclose personally 
identifiable health information for purposes of payment or treatment. In addition, this title 
allows personally identifiable health information to be disclosed to an individual's next of 
kin, and the individual's name or general health status to be disclosed for directory 
information, as long as the individual has not objected to such disclosure. 
o Personally identifiable health information may be disclosed without the individual's 
consent to the following authorities for legal reasons: emergency circumstances, oversight, 
public health, health research, judicial and administrative purposes, non-law enforcement 
subpoenas, law enforcement, and certified health information services. 
The enforcement of the Act involves many geographically dispersed entities, including 
health care providers, patients, next of kin of patients, emergency department, the court and health 
information services, etc. They employ different RBACs as access control system. These entities 
could be regarded as the organizations in our case study and the medical records could be regarded 
as resources. 
• Health information trustees check attributes of the patients. With the attributes contained 
in the certificate, trustees could easily locate each patient's personal medical record and 
grant the owner of the record corresponding permissions. 
• Patient issues certificate to a third party, for either payment or treatment reason. With the 
certificate, the third party can access the patient's medical records. 
e Trustees need to know the credibility of the various issuing bodies, for example, the 
emergency department of a hospital, a certified institutional review board (IRB) or a 
district court. But the identities of the trustees are often difficult to know in advance. With 
trust empowerment, the problem can be easily solved. The trustees are distinguished and 
trusted by their attributes which are certified by the NHS. 
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7 Conclusion and future work 
7.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we first reviewed traditional access control models. The most commonly used 
access control models were access matrix and RBAC. Access matrix uses a two dimensional 
matrix to represent the relationships between subjects and objects. RBAC uses role in between 
users and permissions to gain more flexibility. They were effective in traditional centrally 
managed organizations where the identities and privileges of the subjects are known and managed 
in one point. However, in distributed environment, different systems adopt different access control 
models; people frequently move from one place to another; the identities and privileges of the 
users are administered in dispersed locations. Traditional access control models are incompetent to 
deal with the new circumstances. 
PKI has been proved to be an effective and secure infrastructure in distributed environment. 
A subject owns a public/private key pair. The public key can be disclosed to anyone and the 
identity of the subject is represented by the public key. Certificate is used to transfer information 
between subjects. It is protected by the digital signature and can be disclosed to anyone. 
We then examined a number of mainstream distributed access control models that are based 
on PKI. In their work, delegation is the most commonly adopted mechanism for decentralised 
administration of trust. The concept of delegation is that a subject (delegator) is able to grant a 
subset of his privileges to another subject (delegatee) therefore the delegatee could be able to 
access to specific resources. The deficiency of delegation is that the identities of both the 
delegators and delegatees and the details of the delegated privileges must be known in advance, 
which is sometimes impossible. This deficiency severely hampers the decentralisation of trust. 
The main contribution of this thesis is our new model of decentralised administration of trust: 
trust empowerment. We tried to solve the limitations of delegation through this new model. In our 
model, trust is defined as properties and conveyed in certificate. The certificate is employed to 
help convey and establish trust between subjects. A certificate can also prove the credibility of 
other certificates. A subject is called root of trust if it is trusted by other subjects through its 
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identity. A subject only knows a limited number of roots of trust because of time and space 
restriction. Trust empowerment enables a subject to establish trust with many more subjects 
through their properties instead of identities. The access to the resource is determined by the 
certificates and policy. The features of trust empowennent are: 
o Trust is subjective. Each entity sets its own trust policy which is independent of others. 
The consequence is that one entity is trusted at one place and may be untrusted at another. 
o Fine-grained control. The service provider could finely control how the trust is conveyed 
from one subject to another and specify what each subject can do or cannot do. 
• Trust is based on properties. Trust is defined as properties, which include attributes and 
capabilities. Properties can be owned and/or controlled. The property owner can use the 
privileges denoted by the property. The property controller can grant the property to other 
subjects but cannot use the privilege. A subject grants trust to another subject according to 
the attributes rather than the identities. 
We have designed the Mojoy trust policy language that supports the concept of trust 
empowerment. The Mojoy trust policy language is partly based on XACML which is an OASIS 
standard. We have given the syntax, semantics and an XML implementation of the language. The 
advantages of using a language to specify trust are: 
• Policy can be separated from the application and can be reused for different applications. 
One policy can even be distributed in many locations and updated uniformly. 
• Certificate and policy share the same language syntax. Trust can therefore be 
administered in dispersed locations. 
• A language is powerful and expressive enough to describe the complex situations such as 
advance RBAC, dynamic trust relationship, etc. 
We have also developed a compliance checker for the language. The responsibility of the 
compliance checker is to tell whether a user is able to access the specified resource. The 
compliance checker takes in the requested action, user's certificates, local trust policy and the 
environmental parameters as input. It validates the certificates, looks through the policy and 
examines whether the request is supported by the certificates and allowed by the policy. The 
output is a Boolean value: Permitted or Denied, which indicates whether the user could perform 
the action on the resource or not. The compliance checker is developed in Java and is wrapped into 
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a JAR library and Web Service. It could be incorporated into any application developed in any 
language under any platform. 
We have tried to apply our new trust model to a case study. The case study simulates a 
resource sharing circumstance between several organizations. These organizations offer resources 
to their own registered users. Several trust issues need to be addressed when these organizations 
want to share their resources with each other because the users are managed in different locations. 
We try to apply our trust empowerment to the situation and the model successfully solved all the 
trust issues. The achievements of our case study can be extended to practical healthcare domain. 
'1.2 !Future work 
Our work is only a very first step towards building a trustworthy computing network. Much 
more research is needed. 
We have only provided a prototype of the language and more work is needed to complete the 
language. For instance, users might require using self-defined functions to complete complex tasks, 
which we do not support yet. Properties are divided into two categories in our design: attributes 
and capabilities. More sorts of properties are to be defined. For instance, property could be a 
program written by a subject to complete a complicated task. Subjects allow trusted peers' 
programs to be run under their working environment. The compliance checker currently only 
supports one language. Because of the possibility that different applications could adopt different 
languages, it should be able to accept the certificate and policy written in various languages. A 
possible solution is that the compliance checker accepts plug-ins to interpret various languages. 
Also, the present implementation of the compliance checker is only able to deal with one 
certificate and one policy. It is expected that future implementations will be able to process 
multiple certificates and policies. 
Trust varies according to the context. Subjects establish minimal trust at the very beginning. 
They embark upon some primitive and inexpensive business. The trust level between them 
increases as the partners gradually accumulate experiences of each other. They will begin to do 
more and expensive transactions. This is analogous to the credit system widely accepted in 
modem economics. During the process, the trust policies remain unchanged. All completed 
transactions are logged and analysed. Trust level will increase/decrease according to the outcome 
Chapter 7 Conclusion and future work 
of the analysis ofthe transactions. 
9 
[1] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, and A. D. Keromytis, "The Role of trust 
management in distributed systems security", in Proceedings of Fourth International 
Workshop on Mobile Object Systems: Secure Internet Mobile Computations (MOS '98, 
Brussels, Belgium), no. 1603 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Heidelberg, 
Germany), pp. 185-210, Springer-Verlag, July 1999 
[2] W. Yao, K. Moody, J. Bacon, "A Model of OASIS Role-Based Access Control and its 
Support for Active Security", ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and 
Technology, SACMAT, Virginia, USA, May, 2001 
[3] J. Bacon, K. Moody, W. Yao, "Access Control and Trust in the use of Widely Distributed 
Services", Proceedings of Middleware, 2001 
[4] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy, "Decentralized trust management" in Proceedings 
of the IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, (Oakland, CA), pp. 
164-173, IEEE Computer Society, Technical Committee on Security and Privacy, IEEE 
Computer Society Press, May 1996. 
[5] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis, "The Keynote Trust-Management 
System", RFC 2704, September 1999, version 2 
[6] D. Ferraiolo, and R. Kuhn, "Role-Based Access Control", proceedings of 15th national 
computer security conference, 1992 
[7] R. S. Sandhu, E. J. Coyne, H. L. Feinstein, C. E. Youman, "Role-Based Access Control 
Models", IEEE Computer, Volume 29, Number 2, pp. 38-47, 1996 
[8] Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria, DoD 5200.28-STD. United States 
Department of Defense, 1985 
[9] A. D. Keromytis, J. M. Smith, "Requirements for Scalable Access Control and Security 
Management Architectures", Columbia University Computer Science Department 
Technical Report CUCS-013-02, 2002. 
[10] Walt Yao, "Trust Management for Widely Distributed Systems", PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2003 
[11] D. W. Chadwick, 0. Otenko, "The PERMIS X.509 Role Based Privilege Management 
Infrastructure", symposium on access control models and technologies, California, USA, 
2002 
[12] D. Chadwick, and A. Otenko, "RBAC policies in XML for X.509 based privilege 
management", in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Information 
Security, (Cairo, Egypt), 2002. 
[13) "OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)", OASIS standard, Feb. 
2003, version 1, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/xacml/repository/ 
[14] N. Damianou, N. Dulay, E. Lupu, M. Sloman, "The Ponder policy specification language", 
policies for distributed systems and networks, International Workshop, (POLICY'Ol), 
Bristol, UK, pp. 18-38, 2001 
[15] "The medical records confidentiality act of 1995", summary, http://www.cdt.org/privacy 
/medical/950000mrca _ summary.shtm 
[16) "A Brief Introduction to XACML", 14 March 2003, http://www.oasis-open.org 
/committees/download.php/2713/Brief_Introduction_to_XACML.html 
[17] Andras Belokosztolszki, "role-based access control policy administration", Technical 
Report, Number 586, University of Cambridge, March, 2004 
[18) J. Barkley, R. Bagwill, L. Carnahan, S. Chang, R. Kuhn, P. Markovitz, A. Nakassis, K. 
Olsen, M. Ransom, J. Wack, "security in open systems", NIST special publication 800-7, 
1994 
[19) D. F. Ferraiolo, D. M. Gilbert, and N. Lynch. "An examination offederal and commercial 
access control policy needs". In NIST-NCSC National Computer Security Conference, pp. 
107-116, Baltimore, 1993 
[20] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and M. Strauss, "Compliance Checking in the PolicyMaker 
Trust-Management System", In Proc. of the financial cryptography '98, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science, vol. 1465, pages 254-274. Springer, Berlin, 1998 
[21] M. Bartel, J. Boyer, B. Fox, B. LaMacchia, E. Simon, "XML-Signature Syntax and 
Processing", W3C, RFC3275, Feb 2002, http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/ 
[22] T. Imamura, B. Dillaway, E. Simon, "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing", W3C, 
Recommendation, December 2002, http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/ 
[23] Apache XML security library, http://xml.apache.org/security/ 
[24] Entrust Authority Toolkit for Java, https://www.entrust.com/developer/Java/ 
[25] VeriSign Java XKMS and XML Signature SDK, http://www.xmltrustcenter.org/xkms 
/developer/ 
[26] alpha Works XML Security Suite, http://www.alphaworks.ibm.com/techlxmlsecuritysuite/ 
[27] K. Chopra, W. A. Wallace, "Trust in Electronic Environments", Proceedings of the 36th 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'03), 2003 
[28] "Authentication, Authorization, and Access Control", Apache HTTP Server Version 1.3, 
http:/ /httpd. apache. org/ docs/howto/auth. htrnl 
[29] The Open Group, "Authorization (AZN) API", January 2000, ISBN 1-85912-266-3 
[30] ITU-T Recommendation, X.812 (1995) I ISO/IEC 10181-3: 1996 "Security Frameworks 
for open systems: Access control framework 
[31] E. Barka and R. Sandhu, "Framework for role-based delegation models", in sixteenth 
ammal computer security applications conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, Dec 2000 
[32] Ezedin S. Barka, "Framework for Role-Based Delegation Models", PhD thesis, George 
Mason University, 2002 
[33] R. Sandhu, "Engineering authority and trust in cyberspace: The OM-AM and RBAC way", 
in Proceedings 5th ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC-00), (New 
York), pp.111-119,ACM Press, July, 2000 
[34] J. Bacon, K. Moody, W. Yao, "A model of OASIS role-based access control and its 
support for active security", ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, vol. 
5, Nov. 2002 
[35] R. Hayton, "OASIS: An Open Architecture for Secure Interworking Services", PhD thesis, 
University of Cambridge Computer Lab, June 1996, technical report No. 399 
[36] R. Hayton, J. Bacon, and K. Moody, "OASIS: Access control in an open, distributed 
environment", in Proceedings ofiEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, 
May), (Los Alamitos, CA), IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998 
[37] E. C. Lupu, "A Role-Based Framework for Distributed Systems Management", PhD 
thesis, Department of Computing, Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, 
University of London, 1998 
5 
[38] J. E. Tidswell, and J. M. Potter, "A graphical definition of authorization schema in the 
DTAC model", in Sixth ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies 
(SACMAT'01), pp. 109-120, 2001 
[39) M. Sloman, "Policy driven management for distributed systems", Network and Systems 
Management, 2(4):333-360, 1994 
[40] E. Bertino, S. Jajodia, and P. Samarati, "Supporting multiple access control policies in 
database systems", in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP'96), 1996 
[ 41] W. Johnston, S. Mudumbai, and M. Thompson, "Authorization and attribute certificates 
for widely distributed access control", in Proceedings of the 7th IEEE International 
Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises 
(WETICE '98, Stanford, CA), (Los Alamitos, CA), IEEE Computer Society Press, June 
1998. 
[42] M. Thompson, W. Johnston, S. Mudumbai, G. Hoo, K. Jackson and A. Essiari. 
"Certificate-Based Access Control for Widely Distributed Resources". Proceedings of the 
8th USENIX Security Symposium, Washington, D.C., 1999 
[ 43] J. Bacon, K. Moody, J. Bates, R. Hayton, C. Ma, A. McNeil, 0. Seidel, and M. Spiteri. 
"Generic support for distributed applications", IEEE Computer, pp. 68-76, March 2000 
[44) UC Berkeley, "UNIX Programmer's Manual", 7 ed., 1981 
[45] United States Department of Defense, "A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access 
Control in Trusted Systems", NCSC-TG-003, National Computer Security Center, Sep 
1987, http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/NCSC-TG-003.htrnl 
[ 46] B. W. Lampson, "Protection", in Proceedings of the 5th Annual Princeton Conference on 
Information Sciences and Systems, (Princeton University), pp. 437-443, 1971. 
[47] D. E. Bell and L. J. LaPadula, "Secure computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations and 
Model", M74-244, Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts (1976). (Also available 
through National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA, NTIS AD-771543.) 
[48) K. J. Biba, "Integrity considerations for Secure Computer Systems", Mitre TR-3153, 
Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Massachusetts (1977). (Also available through National 
Teclmical Information Service, Springfield, VA, NTIS AD-A039324.) 
[49] R. S. Sandhu, "Lattice-based access control models", IEEE Computer, 26(11):9-19, Nov 
1993 
[50] R. Yahalom, B. Klein, and T. Beth, "Trust relationships in secure systems- A distributed 
authentication perspective", in Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Computer Society 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP '93), (Washington -Brussels -Tokyo), pp. 
150-164, IEEE, May 1993 
[51] "URis, URLs, and URNs: Clarifications and Recommendations", version 1.0, W3C/IETF 
URI Planning Interest Group, W3C Note 21 September 2001, http://www.w3.org/TR 
/uri -clarification 
[52] T. Bemers-Lee, R. Fielding, U.C. Irvine and L. Masinter, "Unifonn Resource Identifiers 
(URI): Generic Syntax", Request for Comments (RFC) 2396, IETF (Intemet Engineering 
Task Force), August, 1998. 
[53] B. McLaughlin,"Java and XML", O'Reilly & Associates Inc., 2000 
[54] L.A. Phillips, "Using XML", Special Edition, Que, Indianapolis, 2000 
[55] World Wide Web Consortium recommendation, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
1.0", Third Edition, http://www.w3.org/TRIREC-xrnl, Feb. 2004 
[56) World Wide Web Consortium recommendation, "Exclusive XML Canonicalization 
Version 1.0", http://www.w3.org/TR/xrnl-exc-cl4nl, July 2002 
[57] "XML Schema Part 0: Primer", W3C Recommendation, May 2001, http://www.w3.org 
/TRIREC-xrnl 
[58] "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C Recommendation, May 2001, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/xrnlschema-ll 
[59] "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes", W3C Recommendation, May 2001, http://www.w3.org 
/TR/xmlschema-2/ 
[60] ISO (Intemational Standardization Organization) /ITU-T (Telecommunication 
Standardization Sector, Intemational Telecommunication Union) Recommendation 
X.509(2001) The Directory: Authentication Framework 
[61] P. NAUR (ed.), "Revised Report on the Algorithmic Language ALGOL 60.", 
Communications of the ACM, Vol. 3 No.5, pp. 299-314, May 1960. 
[62] A. V. Aho, B. W. Kernighan, and P. J. Weinberger, "The AWK Programming Language", 
Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1988. 
